INQUIRY

MAGAZINE

FEBRUARY 19, 1979 • $1.25

The FBI's Campaign Against Scientology

Nat Hentoff: *Privacy for the Privileged*

Penny Lernoux, Barton J. Bernstein

SLAUGHTER IN EAST TIMOR



Why Is the Press Ignoring It?

BY NOAM CHOMSKY

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We have the FBI, CIA, DEA, INS and IRS* under surveillance.

And we need your help.

Illegal wiretapping. Assassination plots. Break-ins. Burglaries. We've all been outraged by these and other crimes committed by agents of our own government.

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In 1971, the Committee conducted the first thorough investigation of the FBI ever undertaken by any public or private body, including Congress. J. Edgar Hoover protested—to no avail.

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The Committee for Public Justice depends on the support of people like you. If there's one lesson we've learned in the past few years, it's that safeguarding our liberties requires constant vigilance. We must never stop watching.

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*The Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, Drug Enforcement Administration, Immigration and Naturalization Service and Internal Revenue Service.

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RES PUBLICA

And to you, Mr. President, and to your leadership, and to the respect . . .

■ "Iran under the great leadership of the shah is an island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world. This is a great tribute to you, Your Majesty, and to your leadership, and to the respect, admiration and love which your people give to you."

—JIMMY CARTER, *Dec. 31, 1977*

We ought to know

■ The United States accused Vietnam today of committing aggression against Cambodia and again called for the speedy withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from that country.

"Vietnam is guilty of aggression," the State Department spokesman, Hodding Carter 3d, said in answer to questions.

—*New York Times, Jan. 9, 1979*

Well, kiss my foot

■ President Carter is so well liked in Egypt that citizens are composing poems asking for divine intercession to cure his hemorrhoids. One of the poems, published Sunday by the newspaper *Al Akhbar*, . . . beseeches "Allah to rid you of hemorrhoids, because this illness should have been inflicted on an unjust leader rather than you, oh Carter."

—*Los Angeles Times, Dec. 26, 1978*

The question is, How are they supposed to know?

■ A first-term Democrat in the House recently recalled his difficulty sorting out the pros and cons of the tuition tax-credit bill: "I was walking from the elevator into the House to vote, and you know how the lobbyists line up along the hall there to tell you what they want. Well, about five of them were shouting at me to vote yes, and five more were shouting no. And all 10 worked for public-interest groups! I mean, so how am I supposed to know which vote is for the public interest?"

—*Los Angeles Times, Dec. 7, 1978*

Well, if that's all . . .

■ There was a time when, if my office had existed—let's say, the turn of this century—it would have been enough for me to think in terms of making America's coastline secure, the frontiers impenetrable, and perhaps a few allies here or there helping to maintain a balance of power.

Today, in the ultimate sense, national security means an active and positive engagement by the United States in shaping a rapidly changing world in ways that would be congenial to our interests and responsive to our values.

—ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, *in The New York Times Magazine, Jan. 3, 1979*

Out to lunch

■ At 9:47 A.M. yesterday—12 hours and 3 minutes after he entered the Nassau [N.Y.] County Jail—Douglas J. Moran finished paying his debt to society for the crime of displaying a "for sale" sign in his window. Moran . . . refused to pay a $250 fine for violating a Freeport Village ordinance requiring a permit for all such signs.

—*Newsday, Dec. 9, 1978*

"What Entrapment Means to Me"

■ It wasn't the punishment 13 men expected after their arrest last month in Lansing, Mich., by policewomen posing as prostitutes. The men . . . all pleaded guilty to soliciting. They were fined an average of $200 apiece. Then District Judge Charles Felice ordered them to write essays on how the arrest had affected their lives.

—*New York Times, Dec. 17, 1978*

Oh, shut up

■ Environmental Action wrote Chai Tse-min, chief of the People's Republic Washington liaison office, this week, urging that China "adopt a mandatory deposit system immediately." . . .

The letter from Environmental Action was prompted by the announcement last week that Coca-Cola Co. has signed an agreement with the People's Republic, and will begin shipping Coke to China in a few weeks.

[Diane] MacEachern [of the organization's National Clearinghouse on Deposit Legislation] said that when she read the announcement, "I thought, my God, what would it mean to have no-deposit, no-return bottles in China."

—*Washington Post, Dec. 29, 1978*

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Killing bureaucratic messengers

No news from Iran

AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE, INCLUDING the CIA, has once again been caught flat-footed, this time by the upheaval in Iran. The shah, supposed monarch of all he surveyed, was the keystone of American foreign policy in the Middle East, our satrap and our prospective surrogate policeman. The American government, armed with vast resources of money and personnel, was supposedly privy to the best intelligence in the area. And yet, up to the very end, American intelligence agencies assured the White House that the shah was safe and secure on his throne. What went wrong?

Jesse J. Leaf, former chief analyst on Iran for the CIA, has now provided a clue to the answer. In a recent interview, Leaf disclosed that up until 1972, he issued repeated warnings to top CIA brass that the shah was a despot and a megalomaniac, rather than a benevolent statesman. In a 1972 report to the CIA he warned that the shah was "sowing the seed for popular dissidence." For this perceptive analysis Leaf was "excoriated" by a top official of the CIA. As Leaf reports: "[This official] took me into his office and told me that they could not publish a report like that. This was obviously not the United States line and don't I know better?" The following year, after he received an unfavorable fitness report from the CIA, Leaf resigned.

Leaf's conclusions from his experience are illuminating. "People have the idea of the agency being this efficient operation, but it's not. It's a typical bureaucracy, and the interest is in not being wrong more than in being right. You just don't stick your neck out." In short, "policy pretty much determines reporting rather than the other way around." For trying to bring reality to bear on American perceptions, Leaf was forced to resign; he wanted to tell the American leadership what it didn't want to hear.

This state of affairs violates all the teachings of our civics texts and of the governmental establishment itself. For what we are always told when we object to American policy, especially in such arcane areas as foreign affairs, is that while the policy *seems* mistaken, the government—especially the President—knows best, because it has access to all the secret information, gathered by vast legions of expert agents and analysts, that we poor civilians cannot hope to acquire. The administration leaders *know*; they are the inside dopesters. The rest of us know only the periphery of truth. Therefore, our role is to keep silent and follow our leaders, no matter how harebrained their adventures may seem.

Now this doctrine, even if true, would have horrifying implications for democratic decisionmaking; if the government is truly our representative and our servant, if the citizens are supposed to make the ultimate choices in a democracy, how can they make intelligent choices if the vital facts are systematically kept from them by their supposed servitors?

But setting this problem aside, the doctrine of superiority because of esoteric knowledge had a bad stumble in Vietnam. Vietnam *seemed* to us civilians to be at best a mighty and counterproductive blunder, and to those who looked more closely, another instance of rapacious empire-building. But while appearing to sink into a murderous quagmire in Vietnam, U.S. government officials kept assuring us that they *knew*, that the secret truths to which only they were privy required that we continue to escalate the war. Yet the Pentagon papers alone demonstrated that the President actually knew less about Vietnam than did the habitual readers of the *New York Times*.

How can this be true? Why should a President with access to billions of dollars worth of secrets know less than any well-informed reader of the public press? For one thing, the President and his aides pay rather little attention to the *New York Times*. Why should they, when they have access to all the secret and therefore superior knowledge?

This failure of knowledge violates the conventional theory of how bureaucracy works. The theory holds that each of the thousands of agents in the field gathers his own bits of information and feeds them to the official above him in the hierarchy. This immediate supervisor then winnows the information that he receives from his score of agents, selects what is most important, and feeds it further up the line. This same procedure is repeated at each level. Information flows from the numerous bureaucrats at the base of the pyramid, up the pyramid, until finally the President reads one or two pages that purport to be a distillation of the most important truths.

The trouble with this theory is that it assumes that each bureaucrat, on whatever level, is simply an automaton, programmed to select and pass on the information that is most important in terms of criteria external to the bureaucrat himself. It ignores the fact that the bureaucrat himself has needs and goals, foremost among which is to keep his job and advance up the ladder of promotion. To do so he must keep the favor of his supervisors, who themselves must ultimately keep the favor of the President and his advisers. And even a casual study of human nature demonstrates that generally the best way to do that is to tell the President what he wants to hear, which is to tell him that his present policy, whatever it is, is right.

Bureaucratic folk wisdom backs up this analysis: "Don't make waves." Suppose that anyone, from the President on down, is surrounded by, say, a score of aides. If a policy eventually turns out to be wrong, no one of these aides will be singled out for blame, if indeed the same administration is still in office. The blunder will seem to be a tragic fact of history, attributable to no particular person or group. The isolated prophet among his aides who sees the unpleasant truth—say, disaster looming in Vietnam or Iran

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—is likely to confront hostility and charges of disloyalty, and if he persists, like Leaf, to be forced out or be sent to some bureaucratic Siberia. And if he is proved to be right ten or twenty years later, who is there—except a few little-read historians—to do him honor? Certainly not the President or his aides; "I told you so" has never been the most welcome of phrases.

And so the winnowing process of the bureaucracy works, not to funnel the most important truths up through the hierarchy, but to filter them out, especially if they will offend the top people. And the process will become more ruthless, the closer it gets to the top policymakers. Unpleasant truths are screened out until the President, contrary to myth, knows least of all.

A ruler's traditional response to unwelcome news is of ancient vintage, embodied in the custom of executing the messenger who brings word of military defeat. In short, the incentive structure of bureaucracy works against the possibility of a President being in command of all the facts. "To get along, go along." Shielding the President and top officials from unpleasant truths is rewarded; telling the annoying truth is punished. It is no wonder that the real world belies the comforting myth of Presidential omniscience. ❏

This war no better than the last

Cambodia again

BY LAUNCHING AN ALL-OUT ASSAULT on Cambodia in December, Vietnam lost much of the romantic aura that had surrounded that nation since it drove American forces from its shores. The invasion of Cambodia was undertaken by 100,000 Vietnamese troops and 20,000 troops of the pro-Vietnam National Salvation Front of Cambodia, together with tanks, armored vehicles, and air support. The invading army took Phnom Penh in 15 days. Faced with the prospect of imposing unpopular conscription to fight a long series of border skirmishes, Hanoi instead chose a lightning war.

Neither side in this war is particularly attractive when judged by its domestic policies. In Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, tens of thousands of deaths and atrocities were caused by the rigors of antiurban primitive communism abruptly implemented, violent internal purges within the Communist movement, revenge taken on the losers in the civil war, and the depredations of fanatically egalitarian cadres who resented former merchants and members of the intelligentsia and sought to eliminate family ties and religious belief.

As *Far Eastern Economic Review* described Cambodia:

> By the end of 1977 collectivisation had abolished private property entirely. Everything—land, harvests, utensils, cattle, tools, even clothing—is owned by the State, and meals are taken in common refectories. Families have been broken up, and individuals divided among work brigades according to age and sex. . . . Work is compulsory without exception. . . . Consumption is rigorously rationed. . . . Virtually no private life exists; even marriages are arranged by the State and conducted *en masse*.

In the face of this, it is no wonder that Sihanouk said: "I don't know why they chose to impose such a terrible policy on the people, but they told me it was genuine communism." Nor is it any wonder that in an effort to gain popular support, the National Salvation Front has promised to restore city life, village markets, Buddhist practices, and the use of money, and to end forced communal meals and forced marriages. Because of its draconian measures few will weep now that the Khmer Rouge no longer holds sway over Cambodia.

But no one should rejoice that Vietnam has apparently won. That country is hardly a model of human rights. In Hanoi one finds no equivalent of Soviet dissidents or the controversial wallposters now found in Peking. The Vietnamese government has deliberately orchestrated a campaign of harassment against Vietnamese of Chinese origin from all walks of life—at present even going to the extent of accusing the Khmer Rouge leadership of being ethnically Chinese. Furthermore, Hanoi has imposed a repressive and counterproductive course of economic development on South Vietnam by destroying the region's commercial networks and forcibly transporting people to "new economic zones." The pitiful "boat people" who weigh so heavily on the conscience of the world are refugees from this regimen of racial persecution and economic hardship.

During the colonial period, the French favored the Vietnamese and made them compradors and local administrators throughout Indochina. The anticolonial Communist movement led by Ho Chi Minh was dominated by Vietnamese nationals and inherited a paternalistic attitude toward Laotians and Cambodians. It is therefore no surprise that the original plan of the Vietnamese Communists envisioned an Indochina Federation led by Vietnam. Nor is it surprising that even though the Vietnamese formally dropped this terminology decades ago, the extensive influence of Vietnam in Laos and the December 25 invasion make Cambodians fear that the plan was abandoned in name only.

One way to understand the differences in temperament between the two rivals is to recall that while the Viet-



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namese Communists sought to unite most elements in their country against foreign aggression the Cambodian Communists were fighting a fratricidal civil war, first against Sihanouk (who then allied with them after his overthrow by right-wingers) and later against his U.S.-backed successor Lon Nol. This particularly bitter experience of civil war made the Khmer Rouge more ruthless toward their own people than the Vietnamese were.

Nonetheless, Vietnam's invasion is a full-scale military intervention like that of the United States in South Vietnam and more bloody than the Soviet Union's invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Rumanian leaders are quite right to object that "no reasons and arguments whatsoever can justify intervention and interference in the affairs of another state." It is the rankest hypocrisy for a country like America with its recent record in Indochina to denounce Vietnam's attack. Moreover, the U.S. response shows that America is in danger of moving into an alliance with China. There is a grave danger that American officials, by calling this conflict a "proxy war" (Brzezinski) "encouraged by the Soviet Union" (Kissinger), will make the stakes in Indochina once again global and stimulate the direct participation of the great powers. While Vietnam certainly has no business in Cambodia, America, with its recent record in Southeast Asia so bloody, should keep its hands off and its mouth shut. ❑

The approved Nixon version

Safirized history

WHILE THE VIETNAMESE AND THE Cambodians have been fighting out the last days of the Third Indochina War, William Safire, columnist for the *New York Times*, has been rewriting the history of the Second. On January 11, in a column entitled "Now We Know," Safire breathlessly reveals that, contrary to leftist propaganda and popular belief, the United States did not invade Cambodia in 1970.

Safire owes this startling news to the "Black Paper" recently released by the Pol Pot regime. According to Safire, this document proves what "protesters and dissenters" tried to cover up in 1970: that Vietnamese Communists were using Cambodian territory "as a safe staging area for attacks into South Vietnam." And because the Vietnamese had entered Cambodia illegally, "Now we know we were right—in law, in morality, in military tactics—to attack the forces that had already invaded Cambodia."

Sound familiar? It should. Safire has rummaged in the files, dug out some of the old speeches that he used to write for Nixon and the boys, and dressed them up for readers of the *Times*. Of course, Safire is joshing us a bit when he exclaims, "now we know" that there were Vietnamese Communists in Cambodia in 1970. He didn't need Pol Pot to tell him: He knew it then, as did everyone else, including the "protesters and dissenters." The Vietnamese had long used Cambodian border areas as rear bases. Some of their supplies arrived from the north via routes through the northeastern provinces of Cambodia; others were delivered by sea to the port of Sihanoukville, where they were transshipped to the border area—according to some reports, in trucks owned by high officials of the Cambodian government. Sihanouk tacitly supported the Vietnamese in their struggle to kick the Americans out of their country; as Safire himself admits, quoting a Cambodian official, Sihanouk " 'wanted to be in solidarity with the Vietnamese.' " Calling the Vietnamese "invaders" does violence to the word. "Pushy guests" would be a better way to put it.

Of course Nixon did not, as Safire implies, invade Cambodia to rescue it from Vietnamese "invaders." To be blunt, Nixon didn't give a damn about Cambodia. Wanting to buy time for his "Vietnamization" program, Nixon hoped the invasion would eliminate the Communist bases and take pressure off South Vietnam. Opponents of the invasion—including the CIA, much of the State Department, the secretary of defense, and millions of people in the streets—warned that the invasion would drive the Vietnamese deeper into Cambodia, drag another country into the fighting, and prolong the agony of the war. Though Safire forgets to mention it, Nixon was wrong; the opponents were right. The result for the Cambodians was the bloody nightmare they are still living.

If that had been the extent of Safire's contribution to historical revisionism, it would have been enough. But it wasn't. Writing of the campaign of "secret bombing" that began in 1969, Safire reveals that "now we know that the bombs fell not on peaceful Cambodians, as our doves were insisting, but on a powerful Vietnamese fighting and logistical force. . . ." This is a startling claim; as far as we know, Safire is the first to make it. That's probably because it's not true.

Consider the facts: In the 14 months of the "secret bombing" campaign American B-52s flew 3695 raids and dropped 105,837 tons of bombs on Cambodia. The planes typically flew in formations of three, releasing 90 tons of bombs from a height of six miles. Below them they left a swath of destruction a mile and a half long and half a mile across. According to all reliable sources, many Cambodians were victims of these undiscriminating attacks. But Safire says that "the U.S. did not brutalize Cambodians with our bombing."

Thus is history Safirized. To be charitable, it may be that Safire has grown a little dizzy from having spent too much time with his nose in the dirty linen of Bert Lance and Billy Carter. But it seems more likely that he is still trying to make us forget that it was Safire's old boss who bears moral responsibility for the tragedy that befell Cambodia. ❑

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FIRST AMENDMENT WATCH

NAT HENTOFF

Privacy for writers and doctors only?

A LONGTIME, AND INDEED honored, investigative reporter for television, Lee Hays, is writing a book about a Brooklyn family that allegedly has engaged in wholesale murder. For this book, Hays interviewed a man expected to be a prosecution witness at the trial of a member of that clan. When the defendant's attorney moved to obtain Hays's notes and tapes of the interview, in the hope that he could use them to impeach the credibility of the witness, Hays resisted on the ground that the New York state "shield law" protected journalists from having to turn over such material.

Ruling against him, New York State Supreme Court Justice Sybil Hart Kooper declared that whatever Lee Hays may have been in the past, he is not a journalist now. Since he is writing a book, he is an author, and there is no language in the shield law protecting authors. (Only "professional journalists" are covered, and that term is defined as "One who, for gain or livelihood, is engaged in gathering, preparing, or editing of news for a newspaper, magazine, news agency, press association, or wire service." Not a word about books.)

Justice Kooper might wisely have stopped at that point, indicating that she was bound by the language of the statute and that the legislators, should they so desire, might want to amend it to include those authors who did investigative reporting for their books. But the jurist went much further, insisting that there is a great divide between a journalist and an author of books. Gosh, she said, "if anyone who wrote anything could call himself or herself a journalist, the results would be ludicrous. Imagine, Betty Ford writes her autobiography. Is she a journalist? Julia Child pens a cookbook. Is she a journalist?"

But Lee Hays is writing neither an autobiography nor a cookbook. In researching the alleged murders, he is using the same techniques as a journalist would. The only difference is that his work will first appear bound between covers. In my own case, having never received a large enough advance for a book to let me do nothing else but write it, I work out magazine and newspaper assignments so that parts of a book first appear in periodical form. If I am unable, however, to sell two or three chapters beforehand, does the shield law leave off protecting me for those parts of the book?

I mention this vulnerability for "authors"—Sybil Hart Kooper is apparently the first judge in the country to rule on the matter—to indicate the multiple snares created by overly narrow restrictions in "protective" statutes. What about scholars and academic researchers, for another example of largely unprotected writers? A survey by the *Chronicle of Higher Education* (Dec. 4, 1978) discloses that in only a few cases have scholars been able to "win a clear-cut legal decision granting them the privilege of confidentiality." Most of the rest are, like Lee Hays, excluded from any shield laws protecting journalists. And in recent years, at least several dozen scholars and researchers have had their records and notes subpoenaed. This possibility is particularly threatening, as the *Chronicle* notes, "for social scientists, whose investigations into such matters as criminal justice, drug abuse, corruption in government, and corporate management often lead them into controversial and legally sensitive areas."

Since May 31, 1978, however, the government—federal, state, and local—has had a much more sweepingly effective means of obtaining notes and confidential sources than by subpoenaing them. On that date, in *Zurcher* v. *Stanford Daily*, the Supreme Court gave law enforcement officials the power to conduct surprise searches of the offices and homes of journalists, authors, scholars, academic researchers, and anyone else in this country. No subpoena is necessary—just a search warrant, which requires no notice.

All that's needed is for law enforcement officials to convince a magistrate they have probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime is on the premises to be searched. For the first time in the nation's history, this decision allows such searches even when the owner or occupant of the place to be searched is not himself suspected of any criminal involvement. Accordingly, the Fourth Amendment rights of "innocent third parties" were shredded by the Court [*INQUIRY*, Aug. 21, 1978].

Although the High Court said that search warrants would be issued carefully and narrowly, the fact—as any criminal lawyer or police reporter knows—is that the vast majority of magistrates are as likely to refuse a request for a warrant as they are to decline an appointment to a higher judicial post. And in any case, as attorney Nathan Lewin points out, "since the proceeding is entirely one-sided—the person whose house is to be searched obviously is not told in advance, so there is no chance to challenge the warrant application—no one usually questions the police's or prosecutor's conclusion that a search is needed."

ONE RESULT OF THE Zurcher decision has been a leveling of all groups that previously had, or thought they had, special privileges. Journalists cannot now use the First Amendment to bar the door to a surprise raid. Doctors and lawyers cannot use their professional relationships to prevent cops from swooping up papers concerning their patients and clients.

In the rush to get legislation to undo *Zurcher*, each group has tried to insure that it, at least, would be safeguarded henceforth. Journalists' associations, while saying that they preferred a law that would protect every "innocent third party" from surprise searches, made clear they would settle for a measure helping only themselves: a bill requiring any law enforcement agency that demanded material from newspapers or individual journalists to seek subpoenas, rather than mere search warrants. (A subpoena requires a hearing, which rules out a surprise raid.) The Authors' League of Amer-

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ica, meanwhile, lobbied the House and Senate, urging that any legislation also protect writers and publishers of books. If confidential materials could be turned up in newspaper raids, so too could they be found when police rummaged through an author's study or a publisher's office.

Not to be left out, the American Psychiatric Association insisted that its members also be immune from surprise searches. Testifying before the Senate Judiciary subcommittee on the Constitution, Dr. Jerome Beigler, chairman of the APA's committee on confidentiality, reminded the legislators of "the infamous Ellsberg case. The office of his psychiatrist, Dr. Fielding, was burglarized and records stolen at the direction of high officeholders, who . . . believed they were good men with honorable intentions. A warrant now permissible [under *Zurcher*] would have made such invasion lawful."

Most judges are as likely to deny a request for a warrant as they are to decline an appointment to a higher judicial office.

There were no lobbyists for the relatively unaffiliated, those "countless law abiding citizens" referred to in Justice Stevens's dissent in *Zurcher*: "merchants, customers, bystanders [who] may have documents in their possession that relate to an ongoing criminal investigation." And who may very well not know that those documents are at all connected with a criminal matter. "The consequences of subjecting this large category of persons to unannounced police searches," said Stevens, "are extremely serious." Among other perils to the innocent third party, "the search for the documents described in a warrant may involve the inspection of [additional] files containing other private matter." After all, to get to what they want, the cops have to go through a lot of other things; and they like to browse as well as you do.

Yet, this "large category of persons" was not entirely forgotten on Capitol Hill. The bill that gathered most support last term was that of Senator Birch Bayh, Democrat of Indiana, which required that any law enforcement official (federal, state, or local) had to get a subpoena whenever he went after putative evidence of a crime in the home or office of *any* innocent third party. Bayh's Privacy Protection Amendment did not, however, get out of committee. What Bayh does this term depends on whether or not he can reach agreement with the Justice Department, which has backed off considerably from its earlier position cheering on the Supreme Court in the *Zurcher* case.

On December 13, 1978, the Justice Department asked Congress to reverse part of the *Zurcher* decision by prohibiting police searches of certain categories of materials. Arguing the need for strengthened First Amendment protections—and ignoring the Fourth Amendment rights of the rest of the citizenry—the department called for special protection for any "work product" being prepared for publication, including broadcasting. Under this proposal there could be no search of the notes, drafts, files, tapes, photographs, films, or interviews of any journalist, author, scholar, professional free-lance writer, or anyone else engaged in any form of public communication. (The plan would curb federal, state, and local agents.)

If a prosecutor or the police want something in particular, a subpoena will have to be obtained. If the possessor of this "work product" resists the subpoena, there could be no search, although the resister might well be held in contempt of court. The only exception would be when the person having the alleged evidence is himself a suspect in the crime under investigation, or when a search is necessary "to prevent death or serious bodily injury to a human being." Although direct evidence of a crime, such as a ransom note, would not be considered a "work product," to get at something like that, a subpoena would also be necessary. There could be no surprise search.

The writing fraternity—from journalists to scholars—was much heartened by this Justice Department recognition of their special First Amendment privileges. To its credit, however, the *Washington Post* gave only two cheers: "The government has no business searching the belongings of lawyers, doctors, teachers or any other citizen for evidence that someone else committed a crime. The same kind of rules that apply to the press should apply to others who may possess confidential information."

Within the same week the President, joining the move to further dilute the *Zurcher* decision, asked the Justice Department to look into ways of protecting additional innocent third parties from surprise searches. Again, these would be selected classes of citizens: doctors and lawyers, maybe, but not "merchants, customers, bystanders."

FROM WHAT I'VE HEARD from sources in the Justice Department, there is much puzzlement as to how to expand the elite Fourth Amendment classes without angering unduly the FBI and other law enforcement agencies, including prosecutors throughout the country. The lawmen say, of course, that if the exciting opportunities opened to them by *Zurcher* are whittled down, they will end up being as hampered in their duties as they were before the decision.

Publicly, Assistant Attorney General Philip Heymann (who drafted the Justice Department's "work product" approach) has been complaining about how hard it is to balance further protections and the needs of the criminal justice system. It's easy, he said, to decide that a psychiatrist's files ought to be safeguarded from a police raid. "But what about surgeons?" Heymann went on. "And why not social workers? What about psychologists?"

But why not—in the name and the spirit of the Fourth Amendment—everybody?

"Oh no," a Justice Department attorney working on the problem told me, "this is not a Fourth Amendment matter. The Supreme Court already decided that in the *Zurcher* case."

Nonetheless, having been ordered to try to cast a protective net around other segments of the populace in the wake of *Zurcher*, the Justice Department is beginning with a design for doctors and lawyers. As in its concept of protecting the "work product" for practitioners of the First Amendment, the department is thinking in terms of safeguarding particular kinds of materials, rather than places, from searches. "If we can do that," a lawyer there says, "we'll move on to consider psychologists, social workers, and the like."

There is no discernible enthusiasm in the Justice Department, however, for exempting all innocent third parties from surprise raids. Indeed, it was with satisfaction that a department source told me in January that most of the members of Congress involved in

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drawing up bills diluting *Zurcher* have cooled toward the notion of respecting the privacy of every single citizen. Among the holdouts are two members of the Judiciary Committee, Birch Bayh and Charles Mathias, the Republican senator from Maryland. The Justice Department intends to reason with them strenuously until "acceptable" statutes come forth.

As of now, in the Justice Department as well as among the majority of the Supreme Court, there is no echo of the warning of Lord Camden, in his 1765 decision denying that *any* magistrate had the power to authorize the seizure of *any* private papers: "Papers are the owner's goods and chattels; they are his dearest property; and are so far from enduring a seizure that they will hardly bear an inspection," wrote Lord Camden, in words that laid the foundation for the Fourth Amendment, "and though the eye cannot, by the laws of England, be guilty of a trespass, yet where private papers are removed and carried away, the secret nature of those goods will be an aggravation of the trespass, and demand more considerable damages in that respect. Where is the written law," he asked, "that gives any magistrate such a power? I can safely answer, there is none."

There is now—in these United States. After the *Zurcher* decision, a county prosecutor in California asked an attorney for a document that his client, then under indictment, had given him. The lawyer said that the attorney-client privilege protected him from having to give up that paper. Instead of going after a subpoena, which would have allowed the defense attorney a chance to argue his claim of privilege in court, the prosecutor quickly and simply got a search warrant. The lawyer's office was ransacked—lawfully. The document was found, but not before the police had also looked through all the other files, many of which contained confidential information from and about other clients.

It is possible that this year or next, that lawyer and others of his class may have their privacy restored by federal law. But the "dearest property" of ordinary, innocent third parties will remain easy prey to those search warrants that James Otis, a Boston lawyer of the revolutionary period, called "the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty."

LAW

WALTER BOWART

The FBI vs. Scientology

ON AUGUST 14, 1978, A federal grand jury in Washington, D.C., indicted 11 members of the Church of Scientology on charges of conspiracy, theft of government property, obstruction of justice, and burglary. Among them was the founder's wife, Mary Sue (Mrs. L. Ron) Hubbard. On August 29, all pleaded "not guilty" to the government's charges.

The indictments followed one of the largest FBI raids in history. On July 8, 1977, more than one hundred FBI agents armed with buzz saws, sledge hammers, and crowbars broke into the church's offices in Washington and Los Angeles in simultaneous raids. For 20 hours the agents combed the two offices and rifled files and personal effects, searching for documents that church members allegedly stole from government files. "It was gangbusters all over again," commented James J. Kilpatrick in his nationally syndicated column.

Although a search warrant listed 150 documents held in specific church files, the agents searched the entire premises and took with them at least 23,000 documents from the Los Angeles office alone. Some of the papers the FBI seized revealed crimes committed by employees of the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Justice Department. Others documented what the church alleges has been a 28-year campaign of misinformation and harassment waged against it by the government.

Church spokesmen say the FBI also gathered up confidential correspondence between the church and its attorneys regarding a massive class action lawsuit that it filed against several government agencies only five months earlier. That suit, for $750 million in damages, accuses officials of the FBI, CIA, National Security Agency, Justice Department, Treasury Department, army, Postal Service, and International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) of conspiring since 1956 to abridge the civil and constitutional rights of Scientologists. The suit alleges that government agencies used informers, infiltrators, and illegal wiretapping and mail surveillance to compile dossiers on the church; that the agencies disseminated unverified, irrelevant, and false information to other government departments, foreign governments, and private organizations and individuals; and that the IRS subjected the church to discriminatory audits and other forms of harassment.

The FBI raid added a new dimension to the church's legal battle with the United States government. Within two weeks of the raid, church attorneys succeeded in convincing a federal judge in Washington, D.C., that the FBI search warrant was illegally broad. "In my view this warrant . . . invited the agents to seize any documents in the Church's files that struck their fancy," wrote Justice William Bryant on July 27, 1977; ". . . the sweep of that discretion is constitutionally intolerable." The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit later reversed Bryant, and the Supreme Court declined to review the case. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit early last November granted a motion by the church and enjoined the Justice Department from "disseminating the seized materials or information obtained therefrom to other government agencies or the public."

That ruling came too late to stop the FBI from releasing to the media the details of its case against the church. *People* magazine, for example, in its August 14 issue, carried an article entitled "Federal Prosecutors Unveil the Astonishing Intrigues of the Scientology Church." It appeared on the same day the grand jury indictment was announced, and must therefore have been based on leaked information.

*THE CHURCH HAS ENER*getically waged its own media campaign against the government. Shortly after the raid on the Scientology offices, the Justice Department released an index of the rec-

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ords it had seized. Several government documents, which allegedly revealed crimes committed by Justice and Bureau of Narcotics employees, were not included on the list, and other documents were incompletely identified. The church responded by releasing its own list, including:

—An IRS memo of April 5, 1976, explaining that during Watergate the Justice Department protected the Richard Nixon Foundation from investigation;

—A memo of October 9, 1968, from Donald F. Durkin, chief of the foreign operations division of the IRS, regarding its cooperation with Interpol in turning over tax records of an American citizen; and

—A report from the office of the U.S. Attorney in Washington, D.C., on a joint effort of the Justice Department and other federal agencies to infiltrate and to put a mail cover on the Church of Scientology.

Shortly thereafter, a Scientology-sponsored group called American Citizens for Honesty in Government made public yet another set of documents known as the "Defeo Report." That report was prepared secretly in the Justice Department, following an order by the attorney general to "investigate allegations of fraud, irregularity and misconduct in the Drug Enforcement Administration." As well as giving examples of personal corruption by leading DEA officials, the report explored links between the DEA and the CIA, and described a controversial program in which DEA agents gambled in Las Vegas with money supplied by the Howard Hughes empire. Among the other "irregularities" discussed was a plot to assassinate the head of Panamanian intelligence, Colonel Manuel Noriega, and a possible scheme to kill General Omar Torrijos.

Of the tens of thousands of documents taken from the church's files during the FBI raids, only 262 were ever shown to the grand jury. These papers, the government charged, were stolen from government files. Attorneys for the church claim, however, that many of those supposedly "stolen" documents had been obtained under the Freedom of Information Act.

The church's paper, *Freedom*, has used the FOIA to uncover abuses in the IRS, Justice Department, and Food and Drug Administration, among others. Other stories have exposed psychiatric abuses in mental hospitals, the coverup of F-111 performance failures, the curious double role of a CIA-employed psychiatrist in treating a member of the McGovern for President Committee, and possible misconduct by the American Medical Association.

ANOTHER ARM OF THE church, the National Commission on Law Enforcement and Social Justice (NCLE), made news around the world with its charge that Interpol was until recently headed by such unsavory characters as Paul Dickopf, a former officer in the Nazi SS and SD. It learned that even in 1940 the FBI was still passing information on Jews to the Berlin-based police organization then controlled by SD leader Reinhard Heydrich. NCLE received documents under the Freedom of Information Act on CIA cooperation with Interpol, including one that connected Interpol with Watergate "plumber" Egil Krogh. Scientology spokesman Vaughn Young accused Bolivian Interpol officials of involvement in the cocaine traffic. NCLE's campaign provoked further investigations by two congressional committees and the General Accounting Office, and led the Minnesota state legislature to prohibit cooperation with Interpol.

The church organized NCLE, like most of its other secular fronts, in order to combat intelligence and regulatory agencies it held responsible for blackening the church's reputation. Thus NCLE began the investigation of Interpol when it learned that the agency had distributed to foreign police false reports about the church disseminated by the Max Planck Institute in West Germany. That psychiatric institution resented church reports on its direct predecessor, the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Brain Research, which had been held responsible at Nuremberg for over 200,000 "Euthanasia Murders." NCLE warned that Interpol had access to raw FBI files and could send unverified or misleading information on American citizens to police forces around the world. Unlike American law enforcement agencies, Interpol is not subject to the Privacy Act.

The church's complaints against government interference are well founded. During the heyday of McCarthyism, in 1954, the air force Office of Special Investigation launched a probe of a Scientology branch near Lowry air force base in Colorado, apparently suspecting that its members were communists or homosexuals. In 1961 an air force document claimed that Scientologists "study a Russian textbook on brainwashing . . . and believe in materialism." In fact, the church cited the textbook as a warning of the dangers of "mind control." As for the materialism charge, another air force memo contradicted that by referring to the "subversive aspects of this metaphysical group." By the early 1960s, army intelligence, the Customs Bureau, the Post Office, and the Justice Department had joined the ranks of agencies looking into the church.

Finally, in 1963, agents of the Food and Drug Administration raided the church's Washington, D.C., headquarters and seized three tons of material, including 5000 books, 20,000 booklets, and 65 E-meters. The FDA claimed that E-meters, devices that measure electrical conductivity in the skin, were phony medical devices banned under the federal food and drug laws. The church went to court and after 10 years of litigation eventually proved that its E-meters, which it uses in religious "confessions," are indeed religious artifacts comparable to holy water. That 1973 decision helped expand the boundaries of religious freedom, and today protects individuals practicing natural healing and nutritional counseling.

The Church of Scientology, often lumped together with other "kooky cults," has few friends outside its ranks; President Nixon even included it on his "enemies list." But some civil libertarians have come to its defense. The National Council of Churches, recognizing Scientology as a religion, strongly supports the right of jailed Scientology minister Rev. Arthur Maren to refuse to answer questions about the internal workings of the church. Former Senator Eugene McCarthy, writing in the *Washington Star*, offers an unusual constitutional defense of the church: "Basic to the constitutional guarantee of freedom to possess and bear arms is the right of the citizen to defend himself against the power of the government. The Scientologists could argue that they were defending themselves against the government, that they are figuratively 'bearing arms.' "

Conservative columnist James J. Kilpatrick sums up the argument this way: "Who's crazy?" he asks. "These meter-reading reverends? Or the government's klutzes who trample the First Amendment underfoot?" ❑

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EAST TIMOR: The Press Cover-up

The American press has ignored or whitewashed Indonesia's slaughter of thousands of people in East Timor.

By Noam Chomsky

ON DECEMBER 7, 1975, INDONESIAN military forces invaded East Timor, the former Portuguese colony, capturing the capital city of Díli, the first major step in a war of aggression that has repeatedly been condemned by the United Nations but still continues without respite. The United States surely knew of the impending invasion; it had been widely forecast in the international press, was expected by Australia, and took place immediately after the departure of President Gerald Ford and Henry Kissinger from Jakarta—where Kissinger had pointedly told newsmen that "the United States understands Indonesia's position on the question" of Timor.

Although Indonesia has effectively sealed off East Timor from the outside world, refusing entry even to the International Red Cross, nevertheless reports have filtered out indicating that there have been massive atrocities, with neutral or even pro-Indonesian observers estimating 50,000 to 100,000 people slaughtered, roughly 10 percent of the population. Nevertheless, the American press—indeed, the Western press quite generally—has evaded the issue, or has, with rare exceptions, adhered closely to the position taken by Indonesia and the U.S. government, a position that was expressed very well by Representative J. Herbert Burke, ranking minority member of the House subcommittee on Asian and Pacific affairs, when he wrote that "it is in all our interests to bury the Timor issue quickly and completely."

At every crucial point, the U.S. government, with the press trailing loyally in its wake, has denied or concealed the atrocities committed by its Indonesian ally and has taken the position that whatever minor improper actions may have occurred in the past, it is now a matter of history and no useful purpose is served by questioning Indonesian control of East Timor. This has made it possible for the United States and its allies to take part in the massacres and repression in East Timor by providing Indonesia with the material support required to carry on its continuing war of aggression, and the ideological support that enables it to do so virtually in secret.

Again, I want to stress the significance of press complicity in these atrocities, unknown to a public that might be sufficiently aroused by the facts to prevent the governments of the industrial democracies from making their decisive contribution to what Shepard Forman, an anthropologist who worked in Timor, described in congressional testimony as the "annihilation of simple mountain people." I want to stress as well that this is not ancient history. Last October a group of Australians who entered Díli harbor in a disabled yacht saw "frigates, patrol boats, barges crammed with Indonesian soldiers, and many aircraft and helicopters"; they heard explosions in the distance, and "were left without doubts that Díli was still a war zone" (*Canberra Times*, Oct. 20, 1978). The Indonesian effort to suppress the independence movement of East Timor continues, with the support of the industrial democracies. The whole affair has great importance well beyond Timor.

East Timor had never been included within the colonial or postcolonial boundaries of Indonesia and, as Forman

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points out, "Indo-Javanese and Islamic influences barely can be noted." Since World War II, he observed, the mountain people "have proclaimed repeatedly their right of self-determination," and they eagerly welcomed the steps toward independence that followed the 1974 Portuguese revolution. As soon as Portugal announced that independence would be granted to the colonies, the tiny elite of Timor formed several political parties, of which the most important were the UDT and FRETILIN.

The UN study *Decolonization* reports that though UDT was initially regarded as the most influential party, "its lack of positive policies, its associations with the 'ancien régime,' together with its initial reluctance to support the ultimate goal of full independence, led many of the party's original followers to swing their support to FRETILIN, which by early 1975 was generally considered to have become the largest party in the Territory." In August 1975 the UDT staged a coup, probably with Indonesian complicity, setting off a bloody civil war that ended a few weeks later in a complete victory for FRETILIN. The UN study estimated the number killed at 2000 to 3000. These figures are worth noting, since the United States, after reports of later Indonesian atrocities began to surface, has tried to claim that many of those killed were victims of the civil war.

The handling of the reports by the first foreign visitors after the brief civil war gives a revealing insight into the pattern of news management that has since prevailed in the United States. On September 4, 1975, the *New York Times* published an account by Gerald Stone, who was described as apparently "the first reporter allowed there [East Timor] since the fighting began." The *Times* story was actually revised and excerpted from a longer report carried by the London *Times* (Sept. 2, 1975). The modifications are instructive.

Stone attempted to verify reports of large-scale destruction and atrocities attributed primarily to FRETILIN by Indonesian propaganda and news coverage based on it, then and since. His major conclusion was that the reports of destruction were vastly exaggerated and that "many of the stories fed to the public in the past two weeks were not simply exaggerations; they were the product of a purposeful campaign to plant lies." He implicated the Portuguese, Indonesian, and Australian governments in this propaganda campaign.

In revising Stone's report for an American audience, the *New York Times* deleted his statement that there had been "much distortion" and exaggeration of the destruction, and eliminated entirely his major conclusion about the purposeful lies of Indonesian and Western propaganda. What the *New York Times* did retain was Stone's description of terrible conditions in FRETILIN hospitals (the Portuguese had withdrawn the only doctor) and maltreatment of prisoners by FRETILIN. The process of creating the required history advanced yet another step in the *Newsweek* account of the edited excerpts that appeared in the *New York Times*. According to *Newsweek*, Stone had reported "devastation," "bloodshed," and FRETILIN atrocities, and his "dispatch supported the stories of many of the 4000 refugees who have already fled Timor" (Sept. 15, 1975).

Note carefully the transition. A journalist visits the scene of reported devastation and atrocities. He finds that the reports were "filtered through the eyes of frightened and exhausted evacuees" or produced by Portuguese, Indonesian, and Australian officials, all of whom "had reason to distrust FRETILIN"—described by Western observers as a national independence movement with a moderate reformist program. He concludes that the reports are vastly exaggerated, in fact, in large measure, propaganda fabrications.

After the *New York Times* eliminates his major conclusion and modifies others, *Newsweek* concludes that he found that the reports were true. Thus the reading public is reinforced in the belief that what *Newsweek* calls "the Marxist Fretilin party" is bent on atrocities and that liberation movements are to be viewed with horror. And the stage is set for general acquiescence when Indonesian military forces, supported by American aid, invade to "restore order." This pattern of news management persists throughout until today, with rare exceptions.

From early September until December 7, 1975, East Timor was effectively administered by FRETILIN. There were accredited Australian journalists in the territory throughout this period, as well as Australian visitors, who have given favorable accounts of the brief interlude of semi-independence. James Dunn, who is perhaps the best-placed Western observer with long experience in Timor, headed an Australian aid mission in October and reported that the FRETILIN administration was functioning effectively and "enjoyed widespread support from the population, including many hitherto UDT supporters." The Australian Parliamentarian Ken Fry has testified to the same effect before the UN Security Council. In the one major book on this period, Jill Jolliffe, who was a correspondent in East Timor at the time, concurs in this judgment. Until mid-November FRETILIN was requesting that Portuguese authorities, who had left toward the end of the brief civil war, return to complete the process of decolonization; throughout the period they requested foreign governments to send observers and fact-finding missions, but in vain.

THE INVASION

IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE COMPLETE victory of FRETILIN in early September, Indonesia began its armed intervention. Indonesian border raids began on September 14. On October 16 Indonesian troops, with a few Timorese in support roles, captured the town of Balibo about 10 kilometers from the border that divides East and West Timor. (West Timor has been Indonesian since 1950.) Five Australian newsmen were killed, an effective warning to journalists of the fate that awaited them if they remained after the outright invasion, as Jolliffe comments. Eyewitness reports of Indonesian military action that were filed during this period by Australian journalists Michael Richardson, Jill Jolliffe, and Roger East received little international notice. The town of Atabae fell to Indonesian occupation on November 28, after two weeks of intensive bombardment. The expanding Indonesian attacks and lack of foreign reaction led to a decision by FRETILIN to declare independence from Portugal on November 28, 1975.

A full-scale Indonesian invasion was generally expected at that point. The United States and Australia undoubtedly knew what was about to happen. Diplomatic cables, leaked subsequently in the Australian press, reveal that in August 1975 the Australian ambassador to Jakarta had informed his government that the U.S. State Department had instructed the embassy in Jakarta "to cut down its reporting

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on Timor"; and that the U.S. ambassador had expressed his view that "the U.S. should keep out of the Portuguese Timor situation and allow events to take their course," despite American influence based on Indonesia's need for U.S. military assistance. In October the Australian ambassador advised his government "that Australian knowledge of Indonesian intervention be concealed" to avoid complications with Indonesia. The primary difference between Australia and the United States in this regard is that in the United States the cover-up continues in the media as well; and of course, U.S. complicity by means of military and other support is far greater.

The U.S. government professes ignorance as to what was happening during this period, and press reports adhered closely to Indonesian propaganda. The sympathetic picture of FRETILIN administration conveyed by independent Western observers appeared nowhere in the American press, which depicted this period as one of continuing civil strife. For example, David Andelman of the *New York Times* reported from Jakarta on November 26 that Indonesians "point to their hands-off policy with respect to the civil war that is engulfing Portuguese Timor" while Indonesian destroyers "cruise the waters around Timor to prevent infiltration of arms by sea to the left-wing rebels who seized control of the colony last August." In fact, at that time the civil war had been over for more than two months, and the fighting was, rather, a limited Indonesian incursion. When Andelman wrote, Atabae had been under naval bombardment for 12 days; it fell to Indonesian forces two days later. Andelman wrote that Indonesian forces "have been showing remarkable restraint, for what is at stake [is military aid]. This "remarkable restraint" in fact existed only in the pages of America's leading newspaper.

As already noted, the Indonesian invasion of December 7 took place immediately after the departure of President Ford and Henry Kissinger from Jakarta. The *New York Times* headline on December 8 announced that "Indonesians Hold Portuguese Timor after Incursion." Indonesian forces in fact held only the capital city of Díli, which they had captured with considerable barbarism. The difference is significant. The U.S. government has consistently been claiming that the fighting is essentially over, and that we must accept Indonesian annexation as a fact of life. The *Times* also reported falsely that the civil war (which had ended in early September) had been proceeding until the "incursion" and that Indonesia had been offering "no material assistance to the anti-Fretilin forces." In a perverse sense, the latter claim is true: That is, since Indonesia was itself conducting the military operations, while falsely alleging that "anti-Fretilin forces" were doing so, it is true, technically, that Indonesia was not offering "military assistance to the anti-Fretilin forces."

The *New York Times* persisted in the same distortions in an editorial condemnation of Indonesian aggression, maintaining that "To be fair, there was provocation in the unilateral declaration of independence last month by the leftist Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor, known as Fretilin, which had seemed to be winning the civil war handily against pro-Indonesian forces until Jakarta began to intervene." Recall that Indonesia had not "seized" East Timor but rather held only the capital city. FRETILIN did not "seem" to be winning the civil war, but had won it by early September; Indonesia then began its intervention, not in support of "pro-Indonesian forces," but on its own. The editors of the *Times* did not explain why the declaration of independence was a "provocation" to Indonesia, which had no claims to East Timor, and they said nothing about the Indonesian "provocation" of the preceding months. The *Times* also added that "The real losers are Portuguese Timor's 620,000 inhabitants, whose interests and desires have been ignored by all parties to this deplorable affair"—including the independence forces. Perhaps similar sentiments were expressed by thoughtful British commentators in July 1776.

AMERICAN AID

THE U.S. GOVERNMENT CLAIMS TO HAVE suspended military assistance to Indonesia from December 1975 until June 1976. This turns out to have been as much of a fraud as the pretense of ignorance as to what was happening. Military aid during this period actually was above what the State Department had originally proposed to Congress, and it has increased since. Furthermore, at least four new aid offers were made during this period, despite congressional testimony to the contrary by representatives of the State Department and the Pentagon. The offers included supplies and parts for OV-10 Broncos, which are "specially designed for counterinsurgency operations against adversaries without effective anti-aircraft weapons, and wholly useless for defending Indonesia against a foreign enemy"; this was pointed out in congressional testimony by Cornell University Professor Benedict Anderson, who added that this policy has continued without substantial change through the Carter administration. The "aid suspension" was secret—so secret, in fact, that the Indonesian government was never informed of it. Virtually none of this has been discussed in the national media.

In congressional testimony, the deputy legal adviser of the State Department, George Aldrich, conceding that the Indonesians "were armed roughly 90 percent with our equipment," contended that ". . . we really did not know very much. Maybe we did not want to know very much, but I gather that for a time we did not know." As to this "ignorance," it is a fact that the West generally, and the United States specifically, does not want to know, preferring that the issue be quickly "buried," as Representative Burke has urged, forgotten along with the mass graves and demolished villages of East Timor.

The official U.S. government view is "that resolution of the matter would be best reached by the parties directly involved—the Indonesians, the Portuguese and the Timorese." The legitimacy of the Indonesian "involvement" is precisely what is at issue; the Portuguese strenuously opposed the Indonesian involvement; the Timorese government that was in de facto control of the territory, apart from the border areas already conquered by Indonesia, certainly opposed the invasion—with substantial popular support so far as is known—and continues to oppose it insofar as possible. Thus the official U.S. position amounts to accepting Indonesian aggression and its consequences, whatever the attitudes of the other "parties directly involved," and surely irrespective of the attitudes of the primary party, the people of East Timor themselves. Again, the media have been silent on these matters.

As for the continuing flow of U.S. arms, the country officer for Indonesia in the State Department, David T.

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Kennedy, testified before Congress that one purpose is "to keep that area peaceful"—this, in testimony on the Indonesian invasion of East Timor. Another State Department representative, at hearings just last February, conceded that the conflict persists; he noted, however, "a certain change in the situation," in that a large number of people have moved from areas where they were "under the control of Fretilin to areas where they could be protected by the Indonesian government." Or to translate into plain English: They have fled the merciless attack supplied and concealed by the U.S. government. The cynicism of the government formulations are matched only by those of the press, as we shall see directly.

ATROCITIES

INDONESIA HAS BEEN ATTEMPTING TO conquer East Timor since December 1975, but so far without success. In July 1976, the United States recognized the formal incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia, after a farcical "People's Council" was formed. The State Department legal representative George Aldrich testified that "We actually know very little about the selection process for these delegates [to the People's Council], although the process itself took place at a time of military occupation by Indonesia during which considerable fighting was still going on." Actually, the U.S. government knows all that need be known about the "selection process," but it is striking that on the basis of this professed ignorance the government was willing to recognize the takeover while fully aware that fighting continued, "renewing" arms shipments that had never been halted. While the government professes ignorance about the facts, it is clear about American interests. The State Department legal adviser stated that the United States did not question the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia because it was "an accomplished fact" and "such a policy would not serve our best interests in light of the importance of our relations with Indonesia."

In March 1977, nine months after "integration," David Kennedy testified that about 200,000 of the 650,000 people of East Timor "would be considered in areas under Indonesian administration"—an assessment that contrasts strikingly with the American government's claim that the war was essentially over in early 1976, and that "Timor has effectively become a part of Indonesia." Kennedy testified further that the people are happy with integration: "They have decided their best interest lies, at this time, in incorporation with Indonesia." Their "decision" was expressed in the fraudulent "People's Council." Of course, there were still the two-thirds of the population who had not yet been able to express their "decision" because they were not under Indonesian administration—or to put it in the terms favored by the State Department, because they were not as yet "protected" by Indonesia.

The Indonesian attempt to conquer East Timor has been a story of mounting atrocities, attested to by refugee reports, church officials, letters that have been smuggled out, and other sources. Virtually all independent observers estimate the numbers slaughtered as in the range of 50,000 to 100,000. The foreign minister of Indonesia, Adam Malik, estimated the number killed as "50,000 people or perhaps 80,000" (*Age*, April 1, 1977). But, he added, "what does this mean if compared with 600,000 people who want to join Indonesia? Then what is the big fuss? It is possible that they may have been killed by Australians and not us. Who knows? It was war" (*Canberra Times*, April 1, 1977).

The silence in the U.S. media over this admission is remarkable, no less so than the silence accorded the report by Indonesian church officials, who visited East Timor in late 1976. These officials, who strongly support "integration" and oppose FRETILIN, found that 500,000 people were not under Indonesian military control and that local priests estimated the numbers killed at 100,000. The officials describe a town of 5000 that allegedly had welcomed the Indonesian troops—though a year later only 1000 people remained in the village, the rest having joined FRETILIN in the mountains. They report that of the 30,000 people in the capital city of Díli, the one place where there may have been some initial willingness to accept the Indonesian invasion, 20,000 want to leave for Portugal, and others are now with FRETILIN. Neither this nor other information to the same effect has appeared in the American media, even though the Australian Parliament's legislative research service described the report of the church officials as "significant and disturbing" and concluded that there is "mounting evidence" that the Indonesians have carried out "indiscriminate killing on a scale unprecedented in post-World War II history."

I cannot review here the evidence supporting this judgment, but it is ample. How has the American press responded? The *New York Times* index gives a good indication. In the year 1975, when the fate of the Portuguese colonies was a matter of much concern in the West, Timor received six full columns in the annual index. In 1976, when the Indonesian army was beginning the "annihilation of simple mountain people," coverage dropped to half a column. In 1977, when this massacre was reaching truly awesome proportions, coverage dropped to five lines.

THE COVER-UP

ON THE RARE OCCASIONS WHEN THE PRESS has deigned to refer to this "indiscriminate killing on a scale unprecedented in post-World War II history," it has followed the U.S. government in pretending that the killings took place largely during the civil war. On February 15, 1976, the *New York Times* devoted all of 150 words to a report that "About 60,000 people have been killed since the outbreak of civil war in Portuguese Timor last August, according to the deputy chairman of the territory's provisional government"—that is, the government installed by the Indonesian army. The *Times* report went on to say the FRETILIN had been fighting "forces favoring union with Indonesia." Recall that in the civil war perhaps 2000 to 3000 people were killed, a fact that was not reported by the *Times*.

Thus the remainder of the estimated 60,000 were victims of the U.S.-backed Indonesian invasion. As for the forces "favoring union with Indonesia," these had been defeated in September and played no significant part in the subsequent fighting. These forces did not, for the most part, favor such union, certainly not prior to their defeat in September 1975 and probably not thereafter—if we discount the effects of Indonesian coercion. The fact that the *Times* found it necessary to devote only 150 words to this

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massacre is revealing, as is the falsification of the facts, and the remark, attributed to their source with no comment, that "the war is virtually over" in February 1976. The war continues, while the American press maintains its silence.

James Dunn presented evidence of Indonesian atrocities in congressional hearings in March 1977, based on his interviews with Timorese refugees in Portugal. His testimony was reported, but the story quickly died. The U.S. press, which is assiduous in seeking out refugee reports alleging atrocities in countries that have escaped U.S. domination, has yet to interview these refugees; nor have they appeared before Congress, though Dunn reported that they were eager to testify. Occasionally the U.S. press reports the plight of the refugees in Portugal, carefully avoiding, however, anything they might have to reveal about Timor (e.g., *New York Times*, Oct. 24, 1976).

One can find an occasional indication in the press that something ugly may be happening in Timor. Thus, the *New York Times* carried a nine-line Reuters dispatch (March 1, 1977) on a petition to President Carter by the majority of the Australian Parliament, "charging atrocities by Indonesian troops" and asking President Carter "to comment publicly on the situation in East Timor." But nine lines were evidently considered too many for a topic of such meager significance. The story did not make it to the *New York Times* index because it was deleted from the Late City Edition, which is the newspaper of record for microfilm and for history. *Times* editors and correspondents are much too busy seeking evidence of communist atrocities to bother with the possible massacre of 100,000 Timorese at the hands of a U.S. client using American arms.

Robert Shaplen, the noted Asia correspondent for the *New Yorker*, commented briefly on East Timor in his "Letter from Indonesia" of December 12, 1977. According to his reconstruction of history, "Indonesian troops intervened, somewhat crudely and clumsily, in December of 1975, in a war for independence which the East Timorese were ostensibly waging against Portugal." The idea that the East Timorese were fighting Portugal is a novel contribution, but the reference to the massacre of thousands of people as a somewhat crude and clumsy intervention is typical of the press. Shaplen claims that "the so-called Fight for Freedom" from Portugal, which exists only in his imagination, "turned into a civil war" among several factions, of which one, "the left-wing Fretilin, objected strenuously to the manner in which Indonesian troops moved in to take over the former colony"—an interesting way to refer to the resistance struggle against Indonesian aggression.

"According to neutral observers," Shaplen continues, "some ten thousand East Timorese, including many civilians, were killed by the Indonesian forces. . . ." In fact, "neutral observers" and even those who are pro-Indonesian and anti-FRETILIN have consistently offered figures five to ten times that high, and only the U.S. State Department has given the estimate that Shaplen attributes to "neutral observers." His reference suggests that he is simply passing "information" from some U.S. government source, identified as "neutral"—not an uncommon practice, unfortunately. Shaplen concludes that the Indonesians "don't seem particularly perturbed by the criticisms" that they receive from "many Third World nations," which is natural, given the support they receive from the First World industrial societies and their journalists. He also reports an announcement by General Suharto that "On December 31st [1977], the Army will start a new campaign against the guerrillas," a matter that is of little concern to that observer or his colleagues in the American press.

I have mentioned a few of the many examples of direct reports of atrocities that have been systematically excluded from the American press. A final example is a UPI dispatch from Singapore (*Australian*, Oct. 8, 1977) reporting that "30,000 Indonesian troops are still roaming East Timor slaying men, women and children." The report was based on the account of a French photojournalist, Denis Reichle of *Paris Match*, who was deported from Timor after a six-day visit to a mountain retreat of FRETILIN in East Timor. Reichle gave "a safe estimate" of 70,000 to 75,000 East Timorese killed by the Indonesians in 18 months of combat. The Indonesians, he reported, did not seek combat with FRETILIN forces, but "were 'systematically wiping out' the populations of villages known or suspected to be FRETILIN supporters and destroying FRETILIN supply lines and sources." "He said Catholic missionaries, led by the Bishop of Atambua [in Indonesian Timor], were the only voices in Timor trying to stop the 'systematic killing-off of East Timorese.' " The bishop, he said, "had been trying to get an interview with Indonesia's President Suharto for two and a half months, but his requests had so far been ignored." He also reported that "a German priest had been driven insane by the constant killings in his area." In contrast to fairy tales about a "civil war" in which "pro-Indonesian forces" had defeated FRETILIN, this eyewitness report by a Western journalist did not reach the U.S. media.

REFUGEES

UNABLE TO PROVIDE FOOD AND MEDICAL treatment to a population of half a million under the circumstances described, FRETILIN is encouraging refugees to move to Indonesian-controlled areas, according to James Dunn, who wrote: "It was therefore not surprising to learn that many of the population were encouraged by Fretilin to return to towns and villages under Indonesian control."

We have already seen how these facts are interpreted by U.S. government spokesmen, who speak of the flow of refugees to areas where they can be "protected" by the Indonesian army. The press, once again, adheres strictly to the State Department version of events. Henry Kamm reported on the refugee flow in the *New York Times* (April 19, 1978) in the following terms: "The diminishing of supplies of the Fretilin guerrillas appears to have caused them to lose much of their hold over the significant part of the population of about 600,000 whom they have forced to live in regions under their control." How does Kamm know that the population has been "forced to live" under FRETILIN "control"? How are the "scattered Fretilin groups," who barely exist, according to the Indonesian propaganda ministry and the *New York Times*, able to exert control over the population? These questions do not arise. It is a matter of doctrine, not fact, that FRETILIN must have "forced" the population to live under their control, and that they are now fleeing to areas where they can be "protected" by the Indonesians. It is hardly imaginable that the distinguished correspondent of the *New York Times*—who had just won a Pulitzer Prize for his reporting of the suffering of refugees from communism in Southeast Asia when this dispatch appeared—would report the observa-

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tion by Denis Reichle after his visit to East Timor: FRETILIN forces "are simply East Timorese who would rather die fighting than submit to what they consider to be Indonesian slavery."

The *Times*'s Pulitzer Prize–winning specialist on victims of communism does not provide the source for his insight into the minds of the refugees fleeing from the regions where they have been "forced to live" by the "scattered Fretilin groups." Perhaps it was General Ali Moertopo, Indonesia's information minister, the military officer in charge of the early stages of the Indonesian invasion. He is quoted without any qualification as saying that the lack of security that requires Indonesia to keep foreigners away is not caused by FRETILIN forces (which are supposed to be virtually nonexistent, according to the propaganda line of Indonesia, the United States, and the U.S. media) "but from antiforeign feelings among Timorese, the origin of which he did not explain. 'When they see a foreigner they have a prejudice and would make moves that make trouble,' [General Moertopo] said." Westerners have often been baffled by what they call the "xenophobia" of Asian peasants and tribesmen, a phenomenon, not yet explained by modern anthropology, which seems to arise among groups that are subjected to saturation bombing, forced population removal, and other modes of "protection" designed by their foreign benefactors.

Henry Kamm goes on to say that the international backing for FRETILIN "appears to be limited to highly vocal groups of Australian leftwing students who have made of eastern Timor an issue similar to Vietnam, with Indonesia playing the American role." His comparison of Timor and Vietnam is illuminating. Though this has escaped the *Times*'s Asia specialist, the protest over Indonesian exploits in Timor includes the majority of states in the United Nations, the majority of the Australian Parliament, the Australian labor movement, church groups, and many others. In the interest of burying American complicity in the massacre as quickly as possible, however, it is expedient for the press to pretend that only highly vocal left-wing students are trying to whip up opposition to the Indonesian invasion, as they did, in such an annoying fashion, during the American war in Vietnam.

One of the protesters is Michael Hodgman, a strongly anticommunist Australian MP who had specifically denounced the effort to identify opposition to Indonesian aggression as a left-wing plot. In February 1977, he wrote that "For us, as Australians, to bury our heads in the sand and turn our backs on what is alleged to have occurred, would be a gross act of national moral cowardice . . . future generations would have to bear the same shame and disgrace which fell upon those citizens of Nazi Germany who turned a blind eye to Auschwitz . . ." How much more true is this of American congressmen, journalists, and the public, given the direct American role in implementing the aggression, with its deadly consequences, and building a wall of silence around it. More recently, Hodgman charged in Parliament that 30,000 to 40,000 people have died in East Timor because defoliants destroyed their crops. His allegation received 33 words in the Manchester-London *Guardian* (Sept. 14, 1978)—thirty-three more than it has received in the United States, to my knowledge. Representative Donald Fraser of Minnesota wrote to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance on December 8, 1977, citing "a reliable report that Indonesian forces have been using chemical sprays on crops in areas under Fretilin control and that U.S.-manufactured planes, the OV-10s, are being used to spread these chemicals." The State Department responded that it believed the report to be erroneous. The press has not been sufficiently interested to inquire.

I mentioned earlier Robert Shaplen's off-hand remark that Indonesia planned a new offensive in December 1977. A report by the Asia correspondent of the *Los Angeles Times*, George McArthur, adds some highly significant information (*Los Angeles Times*, Nov. 25, 1977). He quotes a Western diplomat as saying that the Indonesians "are running out of military inventory. The operations on Timor have pushed them to the wall." Indonesian arms supplies have been virtually exhausted, according to this report, even though "the guerrillas now number only about 600 men." McArthur does not explain how a war against 600 men can exhaust the military supplies of Indonesia, but people not constrained by the conventions of American journalism can perhaps draw some inferences. McArthur then reports that arms salesmen from the major Western industrial nations are attempting to pour arms into Indonesia, adding falsely that the Carter administration is "slowing the international sales of armaments."

But his remark about Western arms salesmen is quite accurate; the major arms suppliers do not wish to miss the opportunity to take part in the glorious adventure in East Timor, where Indonesian arms supplies have been virtually exhausted in a war against 600 scattered men. In April 1978 British Aerospace signed a contract with Indonesia for Hawk ground attack/trainer aircraft, well designed for counterinsurgency. The French foreign minister, on a visit to Jakarta in September 1978, reported plans for substantial armaments sales, adding in response to a query that France would not place Indonesia in an embarrassing position in any manner at the United Nations (*Le Monde*, Sept. 14, 1978). The announcement that France too will join in the ravaging of East Timor aroused no great indignation in France, to my knowledge. The Carter administration, meanwhile, had requested a sizable increase in military assistance to Indonesia for fiscal 1978 (*New York Times*, July 17, 1977).

HUMAN RIGHTS

TO CONCLUDE THIS SURVEY, LET US TURN to the human rights reports of the State Department. In the March 1977 report, covering the period when Indonesia launched its murderous attack, there is no mention whatsoever of Timor. The omission is rectified in the 1978 report, which deals with allegations of genocide in Timor as follows, in toto:

> Questions have been raised concerning atrocities by Indonesian troops in East Timor in 1975 and 1976 prior to the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia. The Indonesian Government withdrew and disciplined offending units guilty of individual excesses, but most of the human losses in East Timor appear to have occurred prior to Indonesia's intervention.

The final statement is a disgraceful falsehood. No less disgraceful is the refusal even to concede that questions have been raised concerning atrocities after July 1976, let alone to consider the substantial evidence supporting the allegations that there have been massive atrocities and that the

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U.S. government is participating in them. With the complicity of the press, the State Department is eager to bury the issue as quickly and completely as possible.

The fact that the State Department report "was gentle on alleged atrocities in East Timor, asserting that most lives were lost before Indonesia's intervention in the former Portuguese colony," was reported in the *New York Times* (Feb. 10, 1978). Neither the reporter nor the editors commented on the glaring falsity of this claim or on the significance of the State Department cover-up; nor did they mention that the Carter administration had been stepping up military aid to Indonesia.

The UN has repeatedly called upon the government of Indonesia to withdraw its armed forces from East Timor so that the people of the territory will be able "freely to exercise their right to self-determination and independence." The most crucial vote was the one that immediately followed the Indonesian invasion. The United States abstained. In a cablegram of January 23, 1976, entitled "The Blocs are Breaking Up," UN Ambassador Daniel P. Moynihan took pride in the "considerable progress" that had been made by U.S. tactics at the UN "toward a basic foreign policy goal, that of breaking up the massive blocs of nations, mostly new nations, which for so long have been arrayed against us in international forums . . ." He specifically cited the General Assembly vote on Timor, when the "nonaligned were similarly divided in the voting." This division and the U.S. abstention were significant. As Professor Thomas Franck of New York University Law School testified before Congress, it "sent a clear signal to Indonesia that the United Nations lacked the political will to oppose Djakarta's action and that the United States would turn a deaf ear to the demands of the East Timorese to be accorded the benefits of the firmly established international normative right of self-determination."

The subsequent history shows that this assessment is accurate. I will not review the UN record, but will merely note that two years later, the United States voted against a UN General Assembly resolution calling on the UN Special Committee on Decolonization to send a mission to the territory. This vote again was significant, in the light of the fact that Indonesia was preparing for a new military offensive at that time. The United States was joined by Japan and other countries that, as the *Christian Science Monitor* reported (Dec. 8, 1977), "seek close political and economic ties with Indonesia."

The latter comment is, of course, crucial. The economic advantages offered by good relations with Indonesia explain why the outside world has been intent on burying the tragedy of East Timor, which continues to unfold, quickly and completely.

A COMPARISON

THE PERIOD OF ALLEGED INDONESIAN atrocities in East Timor is late 1975 to the present. The evidence derived from neutral or even pro-Indonesian and anti-FRETILIN sources suggests that the numbers slaughtered in this period may be in the neighborhood of 50,000 to 100,000. There is, of course, another country in the region where major atrocities have been alleged in exactly the same period, namely, Cambodia, where the harshest critics claim that perhaps 100,000 people have been slaughtered since April 1975. In addition, it is alleged by the same critics that perhaps a million have died from starvation and disease, but although the Western press is careful to hide the fact, such deaths are chargeable in significant measure to the American account.

Comparing East Timor and Cambodia, we see that the time frame of alleged atrocities is the same, the numbers allegedly slaughtered are roughly comparable in absolute terms, and five to ten times as high in East Timor relative to the population. Furthermore, the evidence is quite comparable; I have reviewed both cases in considerable detail and my own conclusion is that the sources in the case of East Timor are more credible than those that have received massive international publicity in the case of Cambodia, though there are of course fewer sources in the case of East Timor, since the West prefers silence and apologetics.

We have here two paired examples of comparable allegations concerning major violations of human rights. For Westerners concerned with human rights, the case of East Timor is, obviously, of vastly greater significance. Whatever the situation may be in Cambodia, it is beyond the reach of Western human rights activists. But the case of East Timor is radically different. Even a show of displeasure by the great power that provided 90 percent of the arms for the Indonesian invasion and that continues to provide Indonesia with material and diplomatic support for its depredations while laboring to conceal them, would be likely to have significant effects. The same is true of the other powers that are working to bury the issue as quickly and completely as possible, as they seek to join in the bloodshed by supplying arms themselves. For Westerners who speak of human rights out of genuine moral concern, then, it is quite obvious that the case of East Timor should be the focus of far greater attention than alleged atrocities in Cambodia.

It is instructive, therefore, to compare the Western reaction to these two cases of reported atrocities. In the case of Cambodia, stories of atrocities and repression have not only been eagerly seized upon by the Western media and given massive international publicity, but also embellished by substantial fabrication, a fact that is well documented. In the case of Timor, in dramatic contrast, the media have shown no interest in discovering or exposing what may have happened; quite the contrary. Apart from Australia, there has been near total silence. On the rare occasions when the press deals with Timor, it generally presents as fact the latest handout of the Indonesian propaganda agencies or the State Department, or else reports the iniquity of the resistance, which is forcing people to live under its control.

The difference in international reaction is revealing. Specifically, it reveals how empty and hypocritical is much of the "human rights" clamor in the West. It teaches us something about the meaning of the sudden concern for "human rights" that has moved to center stage just at the moment when the luster of classical colonialist and interventionist ideologies has dimmed.

The nations of the world and honest journalists in free societies need not adhere to these practices and doctrines. They can demand that the International Red Cross, UN observers, and independent journalists be admitted to East Timor, and that the flow of arms to Indonesia be halted so that the invaders will be forced to cease their savage attacks, and the right of the people of the territory to self-determination may finally be exercised. ❑

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A small group of Chilean
ran a sophisticated press
Now they are ri

How 20 Chileans Overt

By Fred Landis

ACCORDING TO SECRET portions of a Senate report, several members of the current Chilean government worked directly for the CIA in the campaign to overthrow Salvador Allende. One of them, Chile's current foreign minister, Hernán Cubillos, was for several years a "principal" agent of the CIA. That revelation came in a closed hearing on October 23, 1978, in the trial of former ITT official Robert Berrellez. Berrellez was charged with having committed perjury during hearings in 1973 of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee into attempts by ITT and the CIA to block the election of Salvador Allende as president of Chile. The leak was part of a defense effort to convince the Department of Justice to drop the case rather than risk further disclosures of "national security" information in court.

Berrellez was threatening to make public the fact—suppressed at the CIA's request from the Senate Intelligence Committee's report *Covert Action in Chile 1964–1974*—that 20 leading Chileans, many now in the government, had been members of a CIA-financed think tank, the Institute of General Studies. CIA funding for IGS began in 1971 and continued after the coup—at least until 1974. Members of the IGS were not simply CIA contacts: They were CIA agents, a counterelite that the CIA backed to replace the Allende government. After the coup, with the military primarily concerned with internal security, IGS members largely took over the administration of the country.

The IGS has been described by one of

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	WHO'S INSTITUTE C
Allende era	
El Mercurio, editor	PABLO BARAONA UR
El Mercurio, editor	TOMÁS P. MACHALI (Freedom of Press C
Portada, Que Pasa, editor	JAIME GUZMÁN ERR
El Mercurio, Soviet expert; *Portada*, writer	JURAJ DOMIC
Portada, editor	FRANCISCO ORREGO
Portada, editor	JOSÉ GARRIDO ROJA
Portada, founder	RICARDO CLARO
El Mercurio, Portada, Que Pasa, editor	HERMÓGENES PÉREZ
El Mercurio, associate director; *Que Pasa*, columnist	ARTURO FONTAINE A (winner of Freedom
El Mercurio, Portada, Que Pasa, editor	CRISTIÁN ZEGERS A
El Mercurio, financial editor; *Portada, Que Pasa*, editor	EMILIO SANFUENTES
	ENRIQUE CAMPOS M
El Mercurio, director	FERNANDO LENIZ C
El Mercurio, owner and publisher	AGUSTIN EDWARDS (
Portada, Que Pasa, editor	JAIME MARTINEZ W
El Diario Ilustrado, director	FERNANDO ZEGERS
El Mercurio, publisher 1970–1973; *Que Pasa*, founder	HERNÁN CUBILLOS (
El Mercurio, Washington correspondent	ADOLFO YANKELEVIC
El Mercurio, columnist	ALVARO PUGA
El Mercurio, chief attorney	CARLOS URENDA ZEG

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ʻew Allende for the CIA

N THE
RAL STUDIES

Military junta period

	Director Banco Central; Minister of the Economy
	Gabriela Mistral Publishing Co.
IAPA)	
	Assessor and adviser on rewriting Chilean Constitution; Council of State; Instructor, Academy of National Security
	Planning section, Ministry of Exterior; Chilean Mission to the United Nations
	Dean of Agrarian Economy, University of Chile
	Adviser to Ministry of Economy; legal adviser to U.S. corporations
	Director, *La Segunda*
	Director, *El Mercurio*
.PA)	
	Director, *Que Pasa*
	Director, School of Economics, Catholic University
(Director, IAPA)	Director of cultural affairs; Director of National Library
	Minister of the Economy 1973–1975
sident 1969–1970)	
	School of Journalism, Catholic University of Santiago
	Ambassador to Germany
[APA)	Minister of Foreign Affairs
	Chilean Mission to the United Nations
	Personal press secretary to President Pinochet
	retired

its U.S. contacts, ITT official Harold Henrix, as "some propagandists working again on radio and television"; and by its British contact, Robert Moss, as "the nerve center of political opposition to Marxism." The classified version of the Senate Intelligence Committee's report on the CIA in Chile echoes Moss's assessment: "The Institute of General Studies became the brain center of all groups opposed to Allende Government [*sic*]."

The IGS organization grew out of a coordinated 1970 media campaign against Allende's election. At the center of this effort were the top executives of Chile's leading newspaper, *El Mercurio*, and of the magazines *Portada* and *Que Pasa*. This media campaign soon meshed with a CIA coup attempt codenamed Track II, whose objective, according to a CIA cable, was to "[c]reate a coup climate by propaganda, disinformation, and terrorist activities intended to provoke the left to give a pretext for a coup." Luis Maira, a Christian Democratic party deputy, wrote of the IGS propaganda campaign to unseat Allende: "Their effort was based on a cynical belief that huge sums of money spent in a giant publicity apparatus could accomplish anything." Three years later Maira was on the junta's "10 most wanted" list, and the IGS was running Chile.

But the coup did not succeed in 1970, because the opposition groups did not have the will, the organization, or the technical know-how to pull one off. Allende won the election and many IGS members left Chile, apparently taken in by their own scare campaign against the leader of the Popular Unity faction. The director of IGS, Pablo Baraona Urzua, fled to Paraguay; Cristian Zegers, who headed the CIA-funded Andalien ad agency, left for Venezuela; Enrique Campos Menéndez settled in Madrid; Marcos Chamudes, editor of PEC, ran across the border to Mendoza, Argentina; and

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Carlos Urenda Zegers, an attorney for *El Mercurio*, went all the way to Australia. As the Senate Intelligence Committee report observes, "When Allende took office, little was left of the CIA-funded propaganda apparatus."

BUT THERE WERE A FEW intransigents, including CIA agent David Phillips, who refused to give up. Phillips took the matter of Allende's victory personally. He had been recruited into the agency back in 1952 while working as a journalist in Chile. Phillips's children were Chilean citizens. He had helped defeat Allende three times already and was not about to throw in the towel, especially now that he was the CIA's director of covert operations for the Western hemisphere.

Phillips had long been close to *El Mercurio* publisher Agustin Edwards, a reliable friend of the CIA. Phillips's *South Pacific Mail* had been printed on the presses of *El Mercurio* in Valparaiso, before Phillips was able to buy his own press and move the operation to Santiago. Phillips later sold the paper to David Hellyer, a career CIA officer working under journalistic cover in Chile for the Copley News Service. In the wake of the dispersal of the CIA's media assets after Allende's victory, Phillips set up a relocation center in Mendoza, Argentina, and went about bringing back those journalists who had fled. Within three months, the CIA had reestablished control over *El Mercurio*. That control was assured by IGS member Hernán Cubillos, who was left in control of the paper by its owner, Agustin Edwards, when he moved to the United States following Allende's victory. Cubillos had been head of *Que Pasa*, whose headquarters originally doubled as the home of IGS. Cubillos published *El Mercurio* with a CIA subsidy of $1,665,000 from 1970 to 1973.

Thus Phillips encouraged CIA sponsorship of the journalists at IGS as part of a long-range plan by the CIA to regroup its friends in Chile following the failure of its Track II coup attempt. That attempt had failed because the vast network of CIA assets established during the Kennedy administration consisted mostly of Christian Democrats; the CIA in Chile was geared to winning elections, not to carrying out a putsch. It is significant, therefore, that the IGS included no Christian Democrats, and that it worked outside the framework of the mass political parties, with militant groups like the truckers and the right-wing *Patria y Libertad*. The IGS was thus the missing link between September 1970 and September 1973; it is the proof that Track II was never terminated.

The IGS played a central role in the October 1972 truckers' insurrection that helped to polarize Chilean politics and discredit the Allende regime. The strikers were led by the Comando de Accion Gremial (CAG), a coalition of guilds and professional associations. The IGS trained 80 *gremio* leaders and prepared all of their press releases. The CIA, meanwhile, funded the strikers indirectly through the CAG and its member organizations—to the total of $124,000.

CIA money kept the strike alive, and the IGS engineered the propaganda campaign. It all began when the IGS composed an open letter to President Allende, in the name of the truckers, that appeared as a full-page ad in all leading newspapers on October 1, 1972. The letter did not deal with any *gremio* issue, but rather with "freedom of the press." The same day, truckers began striking in Aysen province, sparked by a story fabricated by *El Mercurio*, of a Marxist plot to nationalize the truckers. After Allende met with the truckers to assure them he had no such plans, the IGS issued new demands on behalf of the truckers that included Allende's resignation. Their demands were bolstered by the arrival of U.S. warships off the coast of Chile to engage in Operation Unitas.

Meanwhile the Inter-American Press Association decided to hold its annual convention in Chile to investigate an alleged Marxist threat to Chile's free press. "For the first time in its history," announced James B. Canel, IAPA general manager, "the organization will be meeting in a country whose government has been antagonistic to the independent press and the IAPA itself." At its meeting, the IAPA gave its annual Freedom of the Press award to Arturo Fontaine of IGS and *El Mercurio*. Fontaine wrote the lengthy preface to the Spanish-language version of Robert Moss's CIA-funded book, *Chile's Marxist Experiment*.

The Moss book was published by Tomás P. MacHale, then director of books at Gabriela Mistral, the junta's publishing house. A self-styled "free journalist" like Fontaine, MacHale, now an IAPA executive, edited an IGS book issued during the October strike, *Chile: A Critical Survey*. In Chile, books are normally printed in Spanish in a single edition limited to no more than 5000 copies. *Chile: A Critical Survey* was written in English, ran through three printings in October, and was mailed to selected opinionmakers throughout the United States. The book contained an anthology of articles by IGS members on the same theme: Allende's threat to a free press.

The IGS published one other book during the October crisis: If *Chile: A Critical Survey* was intended to justify militant action against the regime, *Participation for a New Society* served as a blueprint for the reconstruction of Chile "after it overcomes the Marxist stage in which it presently exists." Written by economists and attorneys, the latter book was more technical and detailed. The attorney representing the U.S. embassy, Patricio Claro, wrote the chapter on the central role of the military in the new society. The economic plans outlined in the book were written by Fernando Leniz, then director of *El Mercurio* and a vice president of the IAPA. He was also head of La Papelera, a paper mill that supplied Chile's newspapers with newsprint; its threatened takeover by the Allende regime became a focus of press criticism. After the coup, Leniz became minister of the economy.

During the October 1972 truckers' insurrection, the front page of El Mercurio *looked like the psychological warfare leaflets the CIA was dropping on Vietnam.*

During the October crisis, the front page of *El Mercurio* looked like the psychological warfare leaflets the CIA was dropping on Vietnam. The CIA's propagandists hoped to push the government into an overt violation of the constitution. Documents supplied by the CIA to the Senate Intelligence Committee indicate that the CIA planned to force a closure of the paper during October and had so indicated to IGS members at the paper. But Allende side-

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stepped these provocations by meeting with IAPA executives and promising them he would take no action against *El Mercurio* or its paper mill.

At the same time it was waging its media campaign through the IGS, the CIA, according to the 1972 operating directives of its Santiago station, was providing "direct financial support to key military figures who can be expected to develop a meaningful following in their respective services to restrain and perhaps to topple the Allende government."

The two programs were, of course, intimately associated. The classified Senate report indicates that "Efforts were directed toward exacerbating tensions between *El Mercurio* and the Popular Unity government. This was done apparently in an attempt to prompt Allende to take measures against the paper which might persuade the Chilean Armed Forces to intervene." The CIA was heavily funding the IGS, providing over 75 percent of its budget by 1973. From the IGS came "a steady flow of economic and technical material . . . to opposition parties and private sector groups. Many of the bills prepared by opposition parliamentarians were actually drafted by Institute personnel." The upshot, the report concludes, "was a disinformation effort to stimulate the military coup groups into a strong unified move against the government."

CIA propaganda was so outrageous that nobody would have believed it, but a climate of fear produced by killings and bombings had greatly increased suggestibility.

The report supports the view that the Chilean military were neither natural fascists nor mercenaries of the CIA; they were misinformed. The CIA spent only $50,000 on direct financial support to key military leaders—compared to $12,300,000 for propaganda and disinformation. A further indication of the proportionate emphases of CIA efforts is that in 1970 the CIA had at least 43 media contacts in Chile, but only two in the military. The military thus became the target of an elaborate CIA disinformation campaign to break their constitutionalist loyalties to the regime.

THE FIRST MAJOR PIECE of disinformation planted by the CIA in the Chilean media was the notorious "Kunakov Archive." The first installment of this six-part "exposé" appeared in *El Mercurio* two weeks before the 1970 elections. This spy novel, subtitled "The Adventures of a Communist Agent," appeared under the name of Juraj Domic. Domic was a Sovietologist at *El Mercurio* and a researcher at the IGS. Episodes of the "Kunakov Archive," including a chart of the KGB, always appeared next to news photos of Allende. This might have seemed a coincidence were it not for the fact that for 20 years *El Mercurio* had a firm policy of never carrying Allende's picture. The "Kunakov Archive" was greeted with humor and derision; the boomerang effect was so great that U.S. ambassador Edward Korry protested its appearance.

Domic's next disinformation campaign was considerably less humorous. During the March 1973 electoral campaign thousands of copies of two pamphlets were distributed among the military: "Communist Putsch with Support of Elements of the Armed Forces" and "Indonesian Model of a Communist Coup." These pamphlets had originally appeared in the magazine *Portada* under Domic's byline. Two weeks after the actual coup, the IGS published a legal defense of the junta, entitled *Armed Forces and National Security*, that reprinted the two articles by Domic. Domic became an assistant to the minister of foreign affairs and later moved to Chile's UN mission in New York.

Documents supplied to the Senate Intelligence Committee show that the CIA station in Santiago was instructed to ". . . author conclusive evidence Allende government planned to take country by force September 17, 1973." The CIA came up with what would become known as "Plan Z," an elaboration of Domic's Indonesian model.

General Pinochet's coup preparations within the army were coded "Plan Alba," while Admiral Toribio Merino Castro called his, "Plan Alba Marina." The alleged communist Plan Z was the cover and deception used to hide the real military plotting. The most ambitious part of Plan Z involved inventing an imaginary army of 14,000 communist aliens, together with communist weapons and communist training camps.

Plan Z was so outrageous that under normal circumstances nobody would have believed it, but a climate of fear produced by bombings and assassinations greatly increased suggestibility. Bits and pieces of the Plan Z story were leaked over several months. The idea was for the target group, the constitutionalist officers, to put the bits and pieces of the puzzle together themselves, so that they would "discover" a Marxist plot. More than 20 channels of communications were used, but the IGS and *El Mercurio* were the most important vehicles. Thus *El Mercurio* would confirm bogus intelligence reports and rumors circulated through other channels.

Before Pinochet could save Chile from Plan Z, the phantom communist army had to be conjured up. In July 1973 *El Mercurio* began pointing to the unusual number of aliens in the country. By increments the aliens became Marxists, then terrorists, and finally international Marxist guerrillas. The CIA was exploiting public awareness that there had been military coups in Bolivia and Uruguay and that many of the refugees had fled to Chile. Next, IGS member Tomás P. MacHale, as assistant mayor of Providencia (the diplomatic quarter of Santiago), began to make an issue of a mysterious rise in the number of staff members attached to the Cuban, North Korean, and Chinese embassies. A new version of the Kunakov Archive appeared in *El Mercurio*, focusing on a soldier who was a card-carrying communist. What others might have interpreted as the inevitable consequence of universal conscription became a communist plot to infiltrate the army.

This communist army was then given a string of communist training camps and was put in touch with the surplus Cuban, North Korean, and Chinese diplomats. The communist guerrilla training camps were alleged to be in shantytowns in the Santiago area or in remote and inaccessible rural locations. There were in fact rudimentary community organizations in these locations, called Junta de Abastecimiento de Precios, that were concerned primarily with the distribution of gov-

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

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ernment-supplied free food. *El Mercurio* gave these groups a military sounding acronym, JAP, and portrayed their leaders as military officers: Commander Pepe, Commander Mickey.

At the same time that Domic came out with his Indonesian model of a communist putsch, *El Mercurio* carried a story by Teresa Donoso Loero on the communist infiltration of shantytowns. The story was accompanied by an official looking map of Santiago that purported to show how leftist camps were surrounding Providencia. The map played on the subconscious fears of the residents of Providencia—many of them millionaires and leading officers—of surrounding shantytowns, and made those feelings seem respectable by depicting those towns as a military threat.

This map, a central clue to Plan Z, is the only illustration in Robert Moss's book. Moss's map improves on the original: The small triangles representing the camps have grown huge, and deliberately point at Providencia. Next to the map Moss wrote, "They pointed, like long knives, at the heart of Santiago."

In 1975 Pinochet, in an interview with the magazine *Ercilla*, discussed Plan Z for the first time. He said that the communists knew that the leaders of the armed forces would be in Santiago by September 18, Armed Forces Day, and the communists' plan was to behead them all. Pinochet then showed the reporters secret documents of Plan Z, including a map purporting to show the communist encirclement of Santiago. One of the reporters remarked ingenuously that the map was identical to the one that had appeared in *Ercilla* and *El Mercurio* before the coup.

Under the pretext of searching for the elusive communist guerrilla camps, right-wing officers took over entire provinces well in advance of September. One of the most macabre and ingenious aspects of Plan Z was to list the specific leftist assigned to behead each military officer. Once the CIA planted these documents where the military would find them, they became assassination lists in reverse.

Plan Z was not made public by that name until after the coup, but all the essential bits had been disseminated, mostly by the IGS, between January and September 1973. It is significant that even before the failure of the Christian Democrats in March to impeach Allende, the IGS was already working on Plan Z. Although the IGS had no Christian Democratic members it did include Francisco Orrego Vicuña, whose brother Claudio was the editor of *La Prensa*, the official propaganda organ of the Christian Democratic party. CIA records indicate that on September 6, 1973, Claudio Orrego informed CDP leaders that the militant left would begin assassinating opposition political leaders on September 10.

The military struck Allende down on September 11. By October 11, the junta was holding a gaudy ceremony to commemorate the coup and Pinochet was making grandiose claims for the new liberties Chileans would enjoy under the new constitution, which even then was being rewritten. When a journalist asked Pinochet who was in charge of the rewriting of the constitution, the dictator couldn't remember. The name that escaped him was that of IGS member Jaime Guzman, and Pinochet's lack of familiarity with the matter is an indication of who was taking the initiative in civil matters.

At the time, the junta was busy reinforcing the authenticity of Plan Z in its "White Book" to justify and explain the coup. While the Senate Intelligence Committee report admitted that two CIA collaborators actually prepared the White Book, the classified version reads "two CIA agents." Copies were thoughtfully prepared in English and mailed free to selected politicians and journalists in Washington.

The Plan Z documents in the White Book were strikingly similar in ideas and even wording to Juraj Domic's "Indonesian Model of a Communist Putsch." Both the Plan Z documents and Domic's article were reprinted by the Organization of American States in a report in 1974 on the transition of government in Chile: "The Marxist-Leninist Process in Chile." Although it was printed in English under the imprimatur of the OAS the book was actually written by the IGS, specifically by Jaime Guzman, Tomás P. MacHale, and Juraj Domic.

The IGS still functions at 276 Merced, Santiago. As a think tank it supplied the leading civilian members of the current government, especially in such ministries as economy, foreign affairs, and the council of state. Its members engage in junta PR, censorship, economic planning, cultural affairs, and rewriting of the constitution. It is now at the nerve center of Chilean public life, just as it was once central to the CIA's psychological war against Salvador Allende.

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BLOWING ON THE WIND: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954–1960, by Robert A. Divine. Oxford University Press, 393 pp., $14.95.

"How many deaths will it take?..."

BARTON J. BERNSTEIN

A QUARTER-CENTURY AGO, in March 1954, during a series of American nuclear tests in the Pacific, a Japanese tuna boat, the *Lucky Dragon*, unsuspectingly sailed into a cloud of nuclear ash. Most of the fishermen fell ill from radiation poisoning, and within days horrified citizens learned dramatically of the perils of nuclear fallout. As Americans soon discovered, it was not simply a problem for the Japanese: The Atomic Energy Commission admitted that the level of radiation in the atmosphere in the United States had increased during the "Castle" series of tests. "It is quite clear," acknowledged President Dwight D. Eisenhower, "that this time something must have happened that we have never experienced before, and must have surprised and astonished the scientists."

The painful events of March 1954 triggered a public debate about the perils of fallout, the acceptable level of radiation, and the likelihood of genetic damage to future generations. Public anxiety waxed and waned during the next nine years, until the test ban treaty of 1963, while scientists and public leaders engaged in often acrimonious debate. Physicists like Edward Teller and Ernest O. Lawrence minimized the dangers, scoffed at the fears, and insisted that continued testing was essential to the "free world." Other scientists and most peace advocates pushed for a total test ban. Some stressed dangers to health; others emphasized that a Soviet-American agreement would be a crucial step in slowing the nuclear arms race. By 1958, Eisenhower began seeking a test ban. His administration never achieved a formal Soviet-American agreement, but both great powers did halt testing in late 1958 and did not resume until 1961, when the Soviets broke the informal moratorium.

Robert Divine, a diplomatic historian at the University of Texas, describes the controversy about nuclear testing during the Eisenhower years. Defining his task narrowly, Divine usually avoids a close analysis of the larger issues of disarmament and Soviet-American relations, and devotes only passing attention to Soviet purposes. The result is a detailed narrative of American policy and its creation: the bureaucratic fights, the domestic pressures, and the scientific arguments. "It is a tale without heroes or villains," Divine concludes, but its telling, he hints, is hampered by the continued classification of many documents.

Why didn't the public fear fallout from testing before 1954? Divine's implicit answer is that there were no dramatic tragedies. But there is an addi-

EDWARD CARBAJAL

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tional answer, which he nowhere suggests. The government, starting during Harry S Truman's presidency, suppressed information and deceived the nation about the safety of testing. Key documents, declassified after Divine's book was written, reveal that in December 1950 Truman and his Atomic Energy Commission approved the use of a Nevada site for above-ground testing even though there were doubts about the effects of fallout. Despite the National Security Council's recommendations, no careful study of the site or of radiological safety was made. The AEC admitted to Truman that questions about radiological contamination "are not satisfactorily answered at present . . . but may be answered satisfactorily as test knowledge increases through experiments." The unpleasant implication was that some Americans might become unwilling guinea pigs. But the official press release assured trusting citizens that "radiological safety and security conditions . . . have been carefully reviewed." Today, the rate of leukemia in some towns in the fallout area—a vast tract encompassing parts of Nevada, Utah, and Arizona—is much greater than the national average, and the families of some of the leukemia victims in the area have filed claims against the government.

Divine is more inclined to find mistakes than malevolence or cover-ups among policymakers, but he occasionally acknowledges that they suppressed evidence on fallout to constrict the public dialogue at home and abroad. In the fall and winter of 1954/55, for example, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles blocked publication of an AEC report on fallout because it might disrupt his plans for NATO. One high-ranking official warned that the report would spark "an increased demand for the banning of atomic weapons."

Perhaps partly because so many essential documents remain classified, Divine's portraits of Dulles and Eisenhower are less than clear. He does sketch the outlines of a President who was neither an ardent Cold Warrior, as liberals once charged, nor a "political genius," as Murray Kempton has argued. Divine's Ike is cynical and shrewd, sometimes indecisive, and frequently blocked by hawkish advisers. In his last years in the White House, he appointed new scientific advisers who favored the test ban and hoped to achieve a treaty.

The administration, as Divine shows, had no interest in a test ban during most of Ike's first term. In 1954/55, for example, scientists proposed an agreement based on seismic detection (without on-site inspection). This, they believed, might break the stalemate between the great powers, eliminate fallout, and open the way for disarmament, but the President promptly rejected the plan. He complained that such piecemeal approaches were undesirable—that testing should not be separated from disarmament — and claimed that he wanted comprehensive nuclear disarmament. But in May 1955, when the Soviets suddenly accepted the American plan for disarmament, the administration promptly withdrew the offer. In 1955 Eisenhower was not seeking nuclear disarmament, and in any case the Soviets were probably insincere in accepting the American plan. At that time, proposals for nuclear disarmament were nothing more than weapons of propaganda.

[Atomic testing by the AEC in Nevada, Arizona, and Utah made unwilling guinea pigs of thousands of Americans who were exposed to radiation.]

In late 1955, when the pope and Khrushchev called for a test ban and the Soviets won plaudits for their gesture, Eisenhower, Dulles, the AEC, and Pentagon leaders continued to resist an agreement. As Divine concludes, this was both because the Soviets did not offer inspection, and because the administration wanted the improved weapons that future testing promised. In the Eisenhower-Dulles equation, technological advantages would offset the loss of international prestige. Only Harold Stassen, the President's special adviser on disarmament, was tempted to push for an end to testing, but even he backed away under pressure from hawkish advisers like Lawrence and Teller who consistently opposed agreements with the Soviets.

IN 1956, NUCLEAR TESTING became a partisan issue when Adlai Stevenson, the Democratic candidate, sought to reclaim the "moral initiative" for America and urged a test ban partly to halt the nuclear arms race. Stevenson was characteristically unspecific as to whether he was proposing a unilateral American moratorium or an international agreement. While asserting that he wanted to halt the nuclear race, he muddied the dialogue by simultaneously accusing Eisenhower of being "dangerously dilatory" in the international race for long-range missiles. Stevenson, though both hawk and dove, drew support for the test ban proposal from the Soviets and condemnations from many politicians, including Truman and Vice President Nixon.

During that election year, Divine suggests, Ike may have toyed with a test ban agreement and then backed away when Stevenson politicized the issue. The skimpy evidence supports that tentative conclusion. Eisenhower reminded Admiral Lewis Strauss, chairman of the AEC, of "my [repeated] hope[s] that the need for atomic tests would gradually lift and possibly soon disappear." Both Dulles and Stassen, troubled by Soviet propaganda victories abroad, were also urging an American initiative, despite the opposition of the AEC and the Pentagon.

During the campaign, as Divine notes, Eisenhower "brilliantly" exploited the test ban issue for political advantage. He allowed associates to depict Stevenson "as a Communist dupe, a man who could not . . . stand up to the Russians." And campaign aides utilized the Soviets' offer of a test ban and their approval of Stevenson's position as interference in American politics. Eisenhower himself characteristically took the "high road," addressing himself to international security arguments, and thus used his opposition to the test ban to strengthen his already popular candidacy. Despite Eisenhower's short-run success in avoiding a dialogue with Stevenson on testing, the Democratic candidate's emphasis on this issue, as Divine stresses, did contribute significantly to public education and guaranteed that

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the subject could not be ignored in the long run.

By spring 1957, amid international outcries against fallout, the administration was again being castigated by world opinion. When the Soviets proposed "a two- or three-year moratorium," with monitoring stations on Soviet and American soil, Eisenhower found the offer tempting. For the first time, he was willing to separate the test ban from disarmament. But under pressure from the AEC and the Pentagon—and from Teller and Lawrence, who warned of Soviet cheating and promised a relatively clean neutron bomb if testing continued—Eisenhower retreated. His decision undercut Stassen and allowed a jealous Dulles to regain control of Soviet-American arms negotiations.

Divine suggests that Dulles hoped to move toward nuclear disarmament, but quickly decided that the Soviets were insincere and thus, by offering what he knew were unacceptable terms, settled for a propaganda victory. Actually, however, the limited evidence supports an even more cynical interpretation: Dulles did *not* want a test ban or disarmament, and seized control from Stassen in order to block a settlement. Dulles knew that France and Britain, America's two most powerful NATO allies, did not want an international agreement because it would have kept them from developing their own nuclear deterrents. Loyalty to these allies, Dulles's jealousy, and Stassen's own indiscretions killed the chances for serious negotiations in 1957.

During spring 1958, overriding the objections of the AEC and the Pentagon, Eisenhower decided to seek a test ban treaty. Why this reversal within a year? Divine concludes that Dulles had shifted, largely because earlier American resistance had offended world opinion and was thus injuring the administration's foreign policy. Dulles's shift liberated Eisenhower, who feared, as he told an associate, that "unless we [take] some positive action we [are] in the future going to be in a position of 'moral isolation' as far as [the] rest of the world is concerned." By bringing in new scientific advisers, who stressed the feasibility and attractiveness of a test ban, the President found the expert counsel he needed and thus freed himself from dependence on Teller, Lawrence, and their colleagues. The new advisers, led by Hans Bethe and James Killian, concluded that America's nuclear superiority over the Soviets would allow a test ban treaty. Ike even coerced the British, who wanted continued testing in order to improve their arsenal, into accepting the American position. As John J. McCone, the AEC director, later recalled, Eisenhower wanted to "do away with . . . testing, thus eliminating the health hazard, and at the same time . . . slow down the arms race."

Eisenhower rejected a Soviet-proposed test moratorium when hawks at the Pentagon and the AEC promised him a clean and deadly neutron bomb.

In November 1958, the major powers halted testing (without inspection) and began negotiating a treaty that would provide for some inspections but rely mostly on seismic detection. Within a few months, the President discovered that his new scientific advisers had been too optimistic: The detection system could not distinguish between earthquakes and small underground nuclear explosions (under about 20 kilotons), Teller proudly declared, and even larger tests might be muffled if they were conducted in large caverns.

To guard against cheating, the administration concluded in 1959 that it would have to escalate demands and require many more on-site inspections. The Soviets refused. Why? Khrushchev implies in his memoirs, as Divine notes, that he did not want a test ban then: It would have frozen the Soviets in second place in nuclear technology, and the numerous on-site inspections demanded would have allowed the United States to discover that the Soviets "were in a relatively weak position." Curiously, however, under Khrushchev the Soviets still chose to fall behind in the ICBM race while they continued to proclaim superiority.

By spring 1960, the great powers were close to an agreement that would have prohibited all nuclear explosions on land and in the sea and atmosphere; barred large underground explosions, which could be monitored; and established a short-run unsupervised moratorium on smaller underground tests, which might not be detectable. The two nations still had to resolve troubling problems: the duration of the unsupervised moratorium and the number of on-site inspections. After talking with Eisenhower, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan wrote in his diary, "The President is really keen [on this agreement and] would accept further concessions in the course of negotiations to get it." Eisenhower and Khrushchev were scheduled to work out the unresolved issues at the Paris summit conference in May. But the U-2 debacle that month ended the chances for a treaty, when the President refused to comply with Khrushchev's demands for a public apology and a public promise that there would be no further surveillance flights over Soviet soil. After the Paris conference, according to an associate, a despondent Eisenhower complained, "about how he had concentrated his efforts the last few years on ending the cold war, how he felt he was making big progress, and how the stupid U-2 mess had ruined all his efforts. He ended very sadly that he saw nothing worthwhile left for him to do now until the end of his Presidency."

But it was too simple to blame the U-2 debacle alone, Divine concludes. Eisenhower had dallied too long in seeking to achieve a test ban, he had listened to hawkish advisers, and had refused to give up potential developments in weaponry; thus he must bear much of the responsibility himself. Some cynical commentators may question, in the absence of declassified sources, whether by the summer of 1960 Eisenhower actually did want a test ban treaty, for in his memoirs he concluded that to continue the cessation of tests would place America in a "disadvantageous position," and that "prudence demanded a resumption of testing." Although he was unwilling to resume testing, perhaps because he feared the international opprobrium for a lameduck administration, he told President-elect John F. Kennedy, after November 1960, that "our country should resume nuclear tests without delay." ❑

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***TRUDEAU*, by George Radwanski. Taplinger, 372 pp., $14.95.**

Trudeaumania revisited

PETER BRIMELOW

AS THE TIME APPROACHED for Justice Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau to be anointed leader of Canada's governing Liberal party in 1968, hysteria overcame the incestuous Canadian media elite. George Radwanski culls the following ludicrous sample:

> His intelligent, skull-formed face (which might have been carved in alabaster to commemorate some distant war of the crusades) is a pattern of tension, subtlety, unrest and audacity. He is a man who both in his physical presence and intellectual discourse manages to maintain a detached view of his environment, yet at the same time give the impression of being responsive to the play of political forces around him . . . Trudeau is an agent of ferment, a critic of Canadian society, questioning its collected conventional wisdom. He mistrusts rhetoric, has only disdain for pomposity, and longs for contemporary fulfillment through experience.

The fact is that Canadian journalists have a much greater tendency than their U.S. counterparts to abase themselves before cliques within the governing party. This is partly due to a sort of cabin fever induced by Ottawa's arctic wastes, and partly because the Liberals, in power for all but seven of the last 58 years, have effectively established, on the federal level, a one-party state.

Truckling pays. Trudeau's government destroyed *Time* magazine's Canadian edition by refusing to treat advertising in it as a business expense before taxes; his erstwhile flatterer quoted above, Peter C. Newman, is now editor of the local substitute, *Maclean's*, which, to complete the circle, celebrated its first issue as a weekly by suppressing a cover critical of Trudeau. But equally, such sycophancy guarantees that "collected conventional wisdom" will remain distinctly unquestioned, let alone fermented.

Radwanski himself is not totally free of the adulation or the truckling. Although he is a working journalist, his relationship with Trudeau has remained sufficiently cordial for him to be favored with eight hour-long interviews; transcripts of these provide the heart of this book, which just shows what a disaster tape recorders have been for journalism. Trudeau has mastered the politician's art of rattling on with his mind out of gear, and Radwanski was apparently too awestruck to ask incisive questions—which is hardly surprising, given that he agrees uncritically with all the *dirigiste* noises Trudeau makes on such occasions. The author merely regrets that, as prime minister, Trudeau hasn't done more about them.

Whatever the cause, Radwanski's inhibitions mean that this cannot be regarded as a definitive or even substantial analysis of the Canadian who presides over the alternative democratic North American society and its potentially explosive English-French tensions. Radwanski is even discreet about Trudeau's age (he was born in 1919, but lopped off two years on entering politics) and about how he was referred to in the Front de la Libération du Québec manifesto that was read over French-language TV in an attempt to obtain the release of the hostages in the crisis of October 1970. (*La tapette*, untranslated by most of the English-language media, is a vulgar term for homosexual.) This subject makes Radwanski nervous. He studiously avoids the much-discussed private life of Trudeau and his entourage, barely mentioning even those aspects, like his stormy marriage, that have become public. And he fails to address the repeated reports of files kept by counterintelligence authorities on key Trudeau associates.

What is addressed instead, however, is Radwanski's claim that Trudeau's election was "in a limited sense, an experiment with the Platonic concept of a philosopher-king, a leader chosen exclusively for the quality of his thought." This, along with the claim that "Trudeau has an intellect unrivalled among Canadian politicians and quite possibly among his foreign counterparts as well," is crucial to his image at home and abroad.

The claims are based on no evidence at all. Trudeau has followed his nor-

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mal practice of intimidating interviewers by bombarding Radwanski with impressive-sounding authors, most apparently unread. Thus Radwanski tells us in wonderment that Trudeau's philosophy "consists primarily of an overlay of Acton, de Tocqueville, Montesquieu and a host of other thinkers on a foundation of the classical liberalism of John Stuart Mill and John Locke," a claim belied by Trudeau's illiberal record in office. Trudeau also informed Radwanski that he is in favor of individual freedom, but did not volunteer (and was not asked) how this could be reconciled with concrete realities like the 1970 roundup of Québec separatists and the spread of economic regulation during his tenure in office. In fact, Trudeau made it clear that he considers the main threat to freedom as coming from "financial interests, monopolies and cartels." He has, of course, a candidate to help keep them in line.

Trudeau is very fond of talking about "participation" in government. Unfortunately, it often turns out that those participating want things, such as capital punishment, that Trudeau opposes. Accordingly, he has evolved a distinction between "participation" (you) and "decision-making" (him).

But it should be noted that Trudeau in a sense really does believe in participation. He spent some time perplexing the simple pols in the Liberal machine by attempting to use it to mobilize and consensus-build among the great Canadian public, which of course had other plans for its weekends. His attempt at a perpetual heart-to-heart with Canada was naive, impractical, and ultimately banal, which seems to be true of Trudeau-think in general. Like his much-vaunted administrative reforms with their endlessly proliferating committees, it bears the fatal mark of academia—and of the intellectual dilettante.

This curious combination of socialism, patrician hedonism, and pedantry became prime minister 30 months after entering politics, because of the peculiar needs of the institution he had spent his adult life denouncing from the left, the Liberal party of Canada. Basically similar to the Democrats, the Liberals have historically been an alliance of some big businessmen, bureaucrats, ethnic groups, and various progressive elements. Now increasingly it is the party of the regulatory minded "New Class." The core of the perennial Liberal majority, however, is the French vote in Québec, kept in place by massive patronage and frequent waving of the bloody shirt of the opposition Tories' WASPishness and alleged bigotry. The Liberals habitually recruit from the left, and alternate their leadership between French- and English-speakers. As the son of a mixed marriage, perfectly bilingual, Trudeau seemed like the ultimate Canadian. He also fiercely opposed Québec separatism and had a left-wing background. (In fact, Trudeau tends to dislike nationalism per se, apparently out of some residual principles. He has acquiesced in, rather than led, contemporary anti-American "economic nationalism.") To an entire political establishment, Trudeau looked like a renewed lease at the trough.

Trudeau's failure is the failure of the Canadian governing class. Mandatory bilingualism in the public service throughout Canada has been enormously expensive and really missed the point of Québecois nationalism. The province is now ruled by a *séparatiste* party visibly preparing to secede. An ambitious welfare state—top civil servants in Ottawa earn more than their equivalents in Washington—has left an immature economy floundering, unable to pay its way under the concomitant regulation and taxation and an economy increasingly uncompetitive and ever deeper in debt. Finally, *pace* Radwanski, authoritarianism has steadily grown in Canada. In the interests of "efficiency," legal procedures have tilted against the accused even more than is implicit in the British inheritance. The federal police force has been happily spying and using agents provocateurs, arousing little effective protest. Even Trudeau's genuinely liberal decriminalization of homosexuality (part of a package, however, that included a repressive gun control law) has been upstaged by the recent provincial persecution of the *Body Politic*, a Toronto-based gay newspaper.

Heart rather than intellect is Trudeau's appeal. Here is a man who refused to budge when pelted and heckled by Québecois demonstrators on St. Jean Baptiste day in 1968, and who provided a panicked country with the authoritarian leadership it craved during the crisis of October 1970, when the Front de la Libération du Québec kidnapped two government officials. (The sweeping powers of Trudeau's War Measures Act, however, must horrify any civil libertarian and were probably pointless.) No other Canadian politician would dare to reply as Trudeau did in French when asked what he would tell critics who complained that both his constitutional advisers were English-speaking: "I would tell them *merde*." Few people would have reacted with his grace in the midst of Watergate when transcripts revealed Richard Nixon habitually referred to him as an "asshole." ("I've been called worse things by worse men.") The ultimate criticism of Radwanski's book is that it does not catch the drama of this slight, solitary figure, aloof even from his own cabinet colleagues, living alone with his children like the king in the sacred grove, cowing by force of personality the party that by now would normally have sacrificed him to avert 1979's seemingly inevitable electoral disaster. ❑

THE ORIGINS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR, by Maurice Baumont. Yale University Press, 327 pp., $22.00.

THE WAR PATH: Hitler's Germany 1933-1939, by David Irving. Viking, 320 pp., $15.00.

The last good war

SIMON NEWMAN

EXPLANATIONS OF THE Second World War have been more straightforward than those of the First. Before A.J.P. Taylor's groundbreaking, not to say earthshaking, revisionist classic, *The Origins of the Second World War*, was published in 1961, there existed a broad consensus among victors, vanquished, and historians alike. In the words of Maurice Baumont, one of the foremost French exponents of this view, "The origins of the war of 1939 go back essentially to the insatiable appetites of Adolf Hitler." This was written in 1969, so perhaps Taylor's brilliantly

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Hitler, far from planning to dominate the world, simply did what any "rational" statesman would have done in his situation.

argued thesis—that Hitler, far from harboring a plan to dominate the world, did what any "rational" statesman would have done when faced with opportunities presented to him by foreign powers—merely served to close the ranks of orthodoxy.

As chairman of the French Commission on the History of the Second World War, Baumont can claim to be in a unique position to know. His best known work is a two-volume international history of the period between the wars, *La faillite de la paix*, first published in 1945 and frequently revised to take account of his findings in the archives. The book under review is essentially a summary of that work, now for the first time translated into English as representative of what the publisher's blurb calls "the French view."

It is thus not surprising to find that in some respects the book is seriously dated. For example, Baumont returns again and again to the theme of massive German rearmament—"an unprecedented effort which would consume over sixty billion marks in the space of a few years." And he says that Churchill, who stalks these pages as a solitary Cassandra, drew a picture "less gloomy than the reality." In fact the opposite was true, and it is now well established that the extent of German rearmament was less than previously supposed. In any case, neither the existence nor the absence of aggressive intentions can be inferred from the state of German armaments alone. Indeed, if a high level of armaments is to be taken as a sure sign of aggressive intentions, then Germany was surely right to rearm in the face of overwhelming French military superiority. In 1932, writes Baumont, France was the best-armed nation in Europe. It was, moreover, determined to remain so, as became abundantly clear during the League of Nations Disarmament Conference, played out between 1932 and 1934. Hence Hitler's decision to abandon both the conference and the league.

Baumont sees in this decision Hitler's clear intention to follow a path of international crime and anarchy: "He abjured the agreements solemnly made with the international community; he rejected its law, its obligations, its customs, its procedures. He made his own will the only law." But what was the real meaning of this carefully constructed international legal framework?

Baumont himself admits that because its whole purpose was to maintain the provisions of the peace treaties that followed the First World War, it perpetuated French hegemony and German subservience. "The error," he writes, "was to believe that the system's intrinsic strength rendered useless [*sic*] all concessions to Germany, Austria and Hungary. . . ." Was France then at fault for not giving more concessions sooner? Baumont appears to contradict himself by later quoting with evident approval the words of Sir Robert Vansittart, then permanent undersecretary at the British Foreign Office: "The fault in such reasoning would be to forget that the Germans were insatiable."

If the "insatiable appetites" of Adolf Hitler constitute the main element in Baumont's orthodox interpretation of the war's origins, there is a second strand: the abject weakness and surrender of the "appeasers." It is his view of Neville Chamberlain's policy in particular that stands in need of revision in light of research done since 1967, when the British archives for the interwar years were opened. Apparently confident that Britain was rapidly becoming "armed and strong," Chamberlain, according to Baumont, was "ready to undertake a radical revision of the 1919 treaties" and to "make large concessions to satisfy Hitler's claims." On this basis he expected to reach an understanding with Germany.

Baumont's contention that Chamberlain derived confidence from Britain's rearmament is far from the truth. It was in fact a profound awareness of Britain's inability to defend its far-flung empire against Germany, Italy, and Japan simultaneously that caused Britain to back down from war before March 1939, thereby impelling Chamberlain to seek agreement with Germany and Italy once President Roosevelt had ruled out a rapprochement with Japan.

These agreements were designed to maintain the status quo in Europe and were accordingly offered on British terms. Thus Chamberlain sought an undertaking from Hitler to disarm, to abandon the attempt to create an exclusive sphere of interest in central Europe and the Balkans, and to return to the world economic system, that subtle expression of British hegemony. In return, Chamberlain was prepared to consider colonial concessions (mainly in central Africa at the expense of other countries) and to lower tariffs on German exports to the British empire. What sort of "large concessions" were these? The only thing that meant anything to Hitler, a free hand in Eastern Europe, was specifically ruled out. Indeed, Britain applied its financial strength to stemming German economic penetration of the Balkans.

The basic reason for British policy was fear of German domination of the continent, the old balance of power principle. Rather than allow itself to be supplanted as a power of the first rank, which became a real possibility in March 1939 after a string of German successes, Britain decided it was preferable to go to war. Hence the guarantee to Poland, designed in the first instance to prevent a German-Polish agreement. Only then did Hitler order plans for the contingency of war against Poland. He knew, as everybody knew, that the Poles now had no reason to be amenable to his hitherto rather polite overtures. Whatever the merits or otherwise of the British decision, it was one that undoubtedly increased the risk of war and undermines Hitler's unique responsibility for the outbreak of general war.

Baumont gets some of his facts wrong. The question of Germany's claims against Poland was first raised by Polish ambassador Lipski before Munich, not by Ribbentrop afterward. It was not the scheme to make British support for Poland conditional on Polish support for Rumania that was "immediately accepted in Warsaw," but the unilateral guarantee. Chamberlain gave his Birmingham speech on March 17, not 18. Vansittart did not resign from the post of His Majesty's Chief Diplomatic Adviser in 1938; he was appointed to it then.

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Other mistakes are the translator's: Lord Halifax's title in 1937 was Lord President of the Council, not of the Cabinet. Overall, the translation, by Simone de Couvreur Ferguson, is accurate and reads well, but, sometimes, the effect of retranslation from the French is tragicomic. "Never in history," Churchill is quoted as saying, "could a war have been more easily avoided by acting on time, as that war which comes to destroy the whole earth." In fact he said, at Fulton, Missouri, in 1946, "There never was a war in all history easier to prevent by timely action than the one which has just desolated such great areas of the globe." This book helps to preserve much of the mythology upon which such policy-oriented statements were and are made. One hopes it will be read critically in the English-speaking world.

*DAVID IRVING IS NO PRE-*server of myth. The bigger it is, the harder it should fall. The main criticisms leveled against his efforts at demolition concern his use of evidence. Thus A.J.P. Taylor pointed out that Irving, in an earlier book, despite the absence of any documentary proof, found Churchill guilty of arranging the murder of the Polish general, Wladislaw Sikorski. On the other hand, in his controversial *Hitler's War*, Irving claims that the absence of any order signed by the führer absolves Hitler from responsibility for the murder of the Jews. Irving asserts that you would expect to find documentary evidence in the latter case, but not in the former. All that can be said is that the circumstantial evidence in the former case is very slight, in the latter overwhelming.

Nuremberg prosecutors doctored the newsreels to conceal the flags, smiles, and flowers that welcomed the arrival of Hitler's troops in Austria and the Rhineland and Sudeten.

Irving's latest book, *The War Path*, is designed as a sort of prelude to *Hitler's War*; here, his use of evidence, while not free from blemish, is less controversial. As usual, he has made use of many primary sources uncovered for the first time, in particular the diaries of Werner von Fritsch, the hapless general whose appointment as war minister was sabotaged by accusations of homosexuality trumped up by the SS. Of more interest are the files of Göring's *Forschungsamt*, the agency responsible for tapping international communications, which provided Hitler with some unique insights into his opponents' thinking in the prewar diplomatic struggle of wits.

Hitler matched wits not only with foreign statesmen, of course, but also with his generals, whose tendency to insubordination is a recurrent theme of the book. One instance is the contest for supremacy over "Green," the operational plans for the invasion of Czechoslovakia, which shows Hitler's sure strategic sense and his extraordinary confidence in dealing with his "effete and conservative" professional military advisers. But little is new in this.

Irving's view of Hitler's prewar policy, which again is not new, could be described as a synthesis of the orthodox "thesis" of Hitler as planner, and Taylor's "antithesis" of Hitler as opportunist. Hitler's long-term plan was to make Germany a world power through expansion to the east, but he was opportunistic as to means. It is a pity that Irving has omitted, rather than developed, the statement he made in the foreword to the English edition that "At no time did this man pose or intend a real threat to Britain or the Empire." A point well worth debating.

Irving has nevertheless produced a book that deserves to be widely read, because the picture he presents of Hitler and his entourage before the war is a realistic one. In 1945, he reminds us, the staff of the chief U.S. prosecutor at the Nuremberg trials doctored the newsreels of German troops entering the Rhineland, Austria, and the Sudeten territories, with the justification that "flag-waving, smiling faces and the presentation of flowers help to nullify our notion that by these acts these people were planning or waging a war against their neighbors." David Irving has gone a long way to correct the bias dictated by the victors of the Second World War.

WRITTEN IN BLOOD: The Story of the Haitian People, 1492–1971, by Robert Debs Heinl, Jr., and Nancy Gordon Heinl. Houghton Mifflin, 785 pp., $21.95.

Isle of the damned

PENNY LERNOUX

IN THE PORT-AU-PRINCE Episcopal cathedral there is one mural that invariably attracts the eye, Philomé Obin's "Last Supper." Unlike the other religious scenes, which are peopled exclusively by Haitians, Obin's painting includes a white man—Judas Iscariot.

Although tourists tend to dismiss Obin's insult as artistic license, or twisted black humor—most Haitians they come in contact with are smiling and servile—the painting is a true reflection of the people's feelings and an apt allegory of the country's tragic history of betrayal: No other Latin American nation has paid such a desperate price for the still elusive ideal of racial equality.

In *Written in Blood*, Nancy and Robert Heinl's vividly styled study of Haiti, the full panoply of that tragedy is described, from the atrocities committed by Columbus's crew against the island's Arawak Indians, and the subsequent slaughter of the crew by the Indians (prophetically, the first known massacre of white men in the New World), to the limitless cruelty of "Papa Doc" Duvalier and his private army of macabre thugs, the Tonton Macoutes.

The first half of the book, covering the period between the discovery of Haiti by Columbus in 1492 and the start of the U.S. Marine occupation in 1915, fulfills the authors' ambition "to recount for the first time the true, complete, and verifiable story of Haiti." It does not make pleasant reading.

Settled by French "filibustiers," or buccaneers, the western third of His-

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Toussaint L'Ouverture

paniola, now Haiti, was wrested from the Spanish by Louis XIV in the seventeenth century. Thanks to the fertility of the land, the importation of some 700,000 African slaves, and the construction of extensive irrigation works and infrastructure, Haiti evolved into France's most profitable colony, exporting more food, wood, minerals, and spices to Europe than the American colonies sent to England. By the end of the eighteenth century, "rich as a Créole" had become a common saying in France.

Yet Haiti was a crude, conflict-ridden society built on the get-rich-quick ethic of French sailors and soldiers and business adventurers, with a tradition of cruelty dating to the early buccaneers. Frenchmen looked down on Créoles; wealthy whites despised poor ones; and the poor whites denigrated free mulattoes, often better educated than the "petits blancs." All demeaned, and feared, the black slaves.

Under the influence of the French Revolution, these conflicts exploded in a slave uprising in 1791 led by the legendary Toussaint L'Ouverture. Blacks butchered some 2000 whites and mulattoes, and in turn an estimated 10,000 slaves were massacred. The British and Spanish joined in, now on one side, now on the other. During a temporary lull in the carnage, Toussaint was tricked into a parley with the French, taken prisoner, and shipped back to France, where he soon died. His lieutenants—the bloodthirsty Jean-Jacques Dessalines (himself the former slave of a cruel black master), the vain but visionary Henry Christophe, and the tolerant dictator Alexandre Pétion—continued the struggle, and on January 1, 1804, Haiti became the second independent nation in the hemisphere and the first black republic in the world.

But, as the Heinls make clear, victory was relative. Nearly 400,000 people had died, the plantation economy was in permanent ruins, and for decades black Haiti was treated as a pariah by the great powers; diplomatic recognition was reluctantly extended only after the impoverished Haitians paid enormous indemnities, often under the threat of European gunboats. Even their Latin American neighbors, whose own independence movement owed so much to Haiti, snubbed the island republic as a nation of black slaves.

France, England, Spain, the United States, and Germany jockeyed for power in Haiti throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, financing bloody coups and countercoups with outrageously priced loans and armaments until the business of revolution became an end in itself. Typical of the insults suffered by the small nation was the seizure of two Haitian warships, the country's entire navy, by German corvettes on a debt-collecting foray for German merchants. The Haitian government was given till sundown to produce £3000 in indemnities, and only then were the vessels returned, with the Haitians' cherished flags spread out on the bridge of each ship, smeared with excrement.

Within the country, the color lines and geographical divisions of modern Haiti were drawn in blood: the self-styled mulatto "elite," French-educated, Catholic, corrupt, and vain, confronting an illiterate, Créole-speaking black majority, with African cultural and religious traditions; the *noirs* as resentful of the light-skinned *jaunes* as the latter were disdainful of them. Color lines were further complicated by provincial loyalties dating to the revolution, when north, south, and west became separate states. In order to survive, therefore, a Haitian dictator not only had to keep the great powers at bay but also somehow had to bridge the gap between black and mulatto, reconcile regional ambitions, and bribe military and ministers with government sinecures. Few rulers endured, with the more fortunate finally departing from the Port-au-Prince harbor on American or British gunboats while a mob howled on the shore. Less lucky, President Guillaume Sam was dragged from the French embassy and torn limb from limb. Thus corruption, deceit, and cruelty became the only hallmarks of power. The mass of Haitians in the backlands remained dirt-poor and ignorant, taxed to the point of starvation by the mulatto or black government of the moment or used as cannon fodder in periodic uprisings. Very little has changed to this day.

*AS SYMPATHETIC OB-*servers of Haitian society, the Heinls have not ignored the pervasive fear and dislike of the white intruder. On the contrary, they detail the injustices of the Europeans; and are equally critical of such latter-day "filibustiers" as the National City Bank's notorious Roger Farnham, who shipped a large portion of the Haitian treasury to New York on a U.S. gunboat, and of insensitive Washington bureaucrats and AID do-gooders. Yet the Heinls suffer a great blind spot as regards the U.S. Marine Corps. Since the 1915–1934 occupation of Haiti takes up most of the latter half of the book, and had a decisive influence on modern Haitian society, this failing significantly weakens the authors' claim to have written the definitive history of Haiti. In fact, the Heinls are guilty of the same Kiplingesque complex they find in Washington do-gooders. Though the message emerges subtly (perhaps even unconsciously), one is left with the impression that if only the marines had remained in charge, Haiti would be a nice, clean little republic today, instead of a backward fleshpot with Duvalier's fat, luxury-loving son Jean-Claude as president.

As a retired marine colonel who headed a U.S. naval mission in Haiti until expelled by "Papa Doc," Heinl might be expected to treat the Marine Corps saga with sympathy, but not to obfuscate it through his selection of facts. Though the authors have probably read every document available on Haiti, they rely primarily on European and American reporting to describe the military occupation, and this in addition to personal sympathies produces a Cold War warp more typical of U.S. history books written on Latin America in the fifties.

Though I am admittedly no Haitian history expert, I found that small details set my teeth on edge. In describ-

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ing the transfer of U.S. Marines from Haiti to Nicaragua in 1929, for example, the authors explain that this was necessary "for the active campaign in Nicaragua against the troublesome bandit Sandino," a description that would infuriate 99 percent of the Nicaraguan people, who revere Augusto César Sandino as a national hero. The only Nicaraguans who call Sandino a bandit are the Somozas, who came to power through the U.S. Marines.

The 1919/20 uprising against the marine occupation of Haiti, in which some 2250 Haitians were killed, is similarly treated, with peasant "bandits" pitted against heroic marines who daringly assault and overwhelm rebel strongholds. The marines' resurrection of the *corvée*—whereby thousands of Haitian peasants were rounded up for forced labor on road construction—if not whitewashed, certainly comes through in pastel tones; obviously, the Haitians did not know what was good for them. Yet the peasants bitterly resented the *corvée*, just as the mulatto elite chafed under U.S. financial controls.

The marines' attempts to outlaw voodoo were equally counterproductive, since at least 90 percent of the five million population practice these Afro-Christian rituals. True, a large number of good works were accomplished by the outsiders, particularly in the area of health, but for the Haitians these never compensated for the ignominy of a second occupation by a foreign white power. While the authors admit the justice of this grievance, they cling to the belief that all would have been different had the Americans been "allowed to lay the foundations of democracy." But the country's elite

[Haitian resentment against the harsh U.S. occupation exploded into a popular national revolt that cost the lives of 2250 peasants.]

"proved unable to rise to the greatest opportunity ever vouchsafed Haiti by history." Or so say the marines.

The Heinls' description of the Duvalier regime is more objective, although it, too, suffers from partial presentation of the facts. A self-styled voodoo priest who claimed to be the incarnation of the terrifying "Baron Samedi," the black country doctor murdered or tortured his critics among the mulatto elite, eventually repudiating even his closest black collaborators, including Clément Barbot, chief torturer and the man who saved his life during a cardiac arrest in 1959. "From time immemorial in Guinea [spiritual home of the Haitians] every man betrays his neighbor," Duvalier was fond of quoting in Créole. During his long reign (1957–1971) this was literally true. (On one visit to Haiti, about the time that a swollen, fly-blown corpse was left to rot in front of the airport's "Welcome to Haiti" sign, I was escorted inside a clump of garden bushes to conduct an interview. "Your driver is a Tonton Macoute," whispered my frightened informant, peering through the bushes at a pleasant-faced man in a taxi.)

The atmosphere has relaxed considerably since Duvalier's death, although his son's government is just as corrupt and, in a less spectacular way, equally repressive. If not exactly the model republic the Heinls would like, Haiti is firmly fixed in the American orbit. Some three hundred U.S. companies have set up offshore plants in Haiti to take advantage of the island's exceptionally cheap labor and the government-backed virtual guarantee of no strikes. The First National Bank of Chicago recently became the fifth foreign bank to open offices in Port-au-Prince; primarily these banks serve U.S. investments, which have more than tripled since 1974. Much of the tourist industry is controlled by U.S. interests, including the casinos, which are run by U.S. organized crime. "Baby Doc" Duvalier has his own version of the Tonton Macoutes, a select corps known as the "Léopards," trained and armed by the United States.

Meanwhile, the marines are still in evidence, if only for R & R from the nearby U.S. naval base at Guantánamo. The girls are willing, the rum is cheap, and almost every Port-au-Prince black knows a few words in English: "Goddam! Hey Joe! Give me one dollar!" The revolution is not yet.

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F I L M

INVASION OF THE BODY SNATCHERS, directed by Philip Kaufman.

SUPERMAN, directed by Richard Donner.

Star spores

STEPHEN HARVEY

IN THE MOVIES, AS WITH ALL the arts, what separates the masterpiece from the minor classic is that the former transcends its own time, while the latter sums it up in a particularly vivid and compelling way. A movie that falls into this second category frequently ends up by defining for later generations the era that spawned it—in fact, the perspective of time often grants such a film a significance it never had for its original audience.

Don Siegel's revered 1956 grade B chiller, *Invasion of the Body Snatchers*, is a special case in point. In its own time, most people saw it as no more than an unusually creepy entry in the parade of sleazy thrillers that battered the screens of drive-ins and neighborhood theaters two decades ago. Now Siegel's film is recognized as a nightmarish distillation of the whole queasy *Zeitgeist* of the decade in which it was made. Horror films have usually proliferated in those times and places (Germany in the early twenties, America during the Depression) when people have felt most threatened by forces they perceived to be outside their control; so, in the fifties, sci-fi flicks multiplied like radioactive bacteria, their various perils implicitly or overtly representing either the shadow cast by the bomb or the encroachment of the red menace.

What distinguished *Body Snatchers* from its competition, quite apart from the unusual skill of its director, was the fact that the threat it explored was both more subtle and more immediate: namely, the uninflected conformity that many saw as our national malaise in the immediate post-McCarthy years. It was all to the point that the film's action took place in a small town that could have been Anywhere, U.S.A.; that it was indeed hard to tell the pod people from the bland, untainted humans they sought to replace; and that unlike the modus operandi of most movie monsters, the pods took over while their prey slept painlessly—the victims lost their humanity almost without realizing what had happened.

This fable seemed so indelibly the product of a specific era that it should have been folly to attempt a remake twenty-odd years later. Whether its theme is as pertinent to the seventies is a moot point. In any case, Philip Kaufman's new version is an exceptionally intriguing little movie, and one of the few pleasant surprises of 1978, a particularly barren year for films. Kaufman and his screenwriter W. D. Richter have paid the original the exceedingly rare honor of retaining the elements that made the first film so haunting, without ever imitating it too closely. As a result, this *Body Snatchers* is so different from its predecessor that, as it unfolds, the first version recedes from memory. The new one is engrossing enough to stand on its own.

Kaufman's film keeps the basic narrative line largely intact, with a few inside references to the Siegel version tossed in as an added fillip for the cognoscenti: Kevin McCarthy, the leading man in the original, appears briefly to pick up more or less where he left off in 1956, frantically hurling himself at the windshields of passing cars to warn them of their impending doom; and Don Siegel himself has a cameo as a podified cab driver.

The changes that have been made have more to do with locale and the film's dominant tone, both visual and verbal. This time around, the story takes place entirely in San Francisco—a wicked inspiration since, after all, for a lot of people San Francisco is one place where even the most bizarre events happen every day of the week. (In fact, the recent real-life horror in Guyana gives this tale about a popu-

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ace abandoning their individual identities for an eternity of zombiehood a grim undertone the filmmakers, with all their knowingness, could never have anticipated.) Cinematographer Michael Chapman is, after *Taxi Driver*, an old hand at capturing the ominous shadings of the urban landscape, and he subtly transforms even a milieu as post-card picturesque as San Francisco into an unsettling and alien place —all chill blue night, and vivid greenery masking slumbering dangers. The deadpan black-and-white cheesiness of Siegel's version gave it a pseudo-documentary veracity, like something you might see on a news broadcast switched on in the middle of a bad dream. Kaufman's *Body Snatchers*, on the other hand, is exuberantly larger than life, its camerawork kinetically matching the escalating desperation of its protagonists.

As with any really effective horror film, *Body Snatchers* amplifies its effects by hinting at disturbing events happening just beyond its range of vision: As the camera snakes through the heroine's carpenter-Gothic house or up and down the hilly city streets, the uneasy sense of what's occurring just outside the frame weighs just as heavily on the viewer as what he's allowed to see. At the same time, Kaufman depicts the "invasion" with grisly relish. The title-credits sequence follows the trek of the predatory spores: from a distant planet, through space and the earth's cloud cover, coming to rest on the leaves in a San Francisco park arbor where they stretch their tentacles, leaving innocuous red blossoms in their wake. The pod people themselves are both outlandish and revolting in the best monster movie tradition, resembling life-sized human pastries taken out of some infernal oven before their time; a climactic sequence of the birth of a pod out of its green, extraterrestrial mother must be the most gruesome bit of would-be obstetrical humor the movies have ever seen.

Both Kaufman and Richter are canny enough to realize the crackpot comedy implications of the plot as well as its intended horror, and the script and the casting of the main characters combine to deliver a perfect balance of the two. In the first lines heard over the soundtrack, a schoolteacher leading an excursion through the park blithely instructs her wee charges to pick all the pretty flowers. The pod's first victim is the dentist boyfriend of heroine Brooke Adams, and it's clear that he wasn't much of a prize to begin with: a TV-hypnotized lout who really wouldn't care what he turned into as long as nobody changed the channels on him. Hero Donald Sutherland, of the watery eyes and hangdog mien, is a health inspector for the city; before bedlam sets in, he spends his time picking rat excreta out of the cassoulet in haute-cuisine clip joints. The only person he can trust for his mission to save mankind is a spacey poet (Jeff Goldblum) who makes a tenuous living by operating a dingy, if legit bathhouse—a droll turn by Goldblum, the latest in his series of egomaniacal artistes *manqués* after *Next Stop, Greenwich Village* and *Between the Lines*.

Their female accomplices are just as appealingly eccentric. As the Bohemian's spouse, Veronica Cartwright glows with dizzy sincerity, while Brooke Adams, physically and temperamentally a kind of Americanized Geneviève Bujold, is disarmingly matter-of-fact. She imbues the part with just the right mixture of humor, warmth, and spunk, so that her threatened podification is a doubly awful prospect for the viewer.

Kaufman's sure instinct with actors fails only once: To be the psychiatrist who attempts to pacify this gaggle of "paranoids" seeking his counsel, Kaufman's drafted no less than Leonard Nimoy, who certainly has had more than his share of practice playing humanoids before. Even divested of his pointy ears, Nimoy, with the opaque glint in his teensy eyes, and other inevitable traces of his television persona, lets the audience know far too early that he must be one of Them. This makes the protagonists seem rather more dense than was absolutely necessary, and makes the story peak a little too soon in this version, its last half cluttered with too many nocturnal chases and close calls. Nevertheless, Kaufman's affection for the material and the vigor of his approach are as infectious as all those spores from the beyond; only the churlish or exceedingly squeamish could fail to have a good time with this movie.

WHERE *INVASION OF THE Body Snatchers* is about pod people, *Superman* apparently was made by them. While the creators of *Body Snatchers* seem to have been motivated by their passion for the story, the moguls responsible for this gargantua appear to have just shopped around coldbloodedly for a property that would reward them as richly as *Star Wars* did Twentieth Century–Fox. The fruit of their labors is a triumph of packaging; it comprises a constellation of stars both major (Marlon Brando) and mini (Maria Schell, Trevor Howard, Terence Stamp, et al., some of whom are on and off quicker than you can say Mr. Mxyzptlk); a passel of screenwriters combining a touch of the grandiose (Mario Puzo) and the satirical (Robert Benton and David and Leslie Newman); a director with a proven facility for cinematic hocus-pocus (Richard Donner of *The Omen*); plus the musical trumpery of John Williams to goose the audience in anticipation of each new explosion of special effects. For box-office insurance, practically every surefire blockbuster gimmick of the last decade has been tossed in, and the final product is really four separate movies spliced together into one disjointed epic.

Part One is a *Star Wars* homage with a dash of Christian allegory added for good measure; the crystal-grotto planet Krypton is threatened with solar holocaust, and celestial father-figure Brando, all elocutionary grandeur, dispatches his infant son in a space crèche bound for earth. In Part Two, the child Superman is delivered to Glenn Ford and Phyllis Thaxter standing in for Joseph and Mary, and quite touchingly too—wind-eroded Norman Rockwell archetypes dwarfed in endless vistas of the American heartland. Part Three is campy screwball comedy: Grown-up Superman Christopher Reeve lands in New York to match wits with evil mortal Gene Hackman and be vamped by newsperson Margot Kidder, a Lois Lane according to the gospel of *Playgirl*, with jaded eyes that brighten at the vision of this unearthly hunk in cape and tights. Part Four is the disaster movie to end (one hopes) all disaster movies, as Superman prevents a well-timed missile from exploding the San Andreas fault and sinking the West Coast into the Pacific. (Which, come to think of it, would have been a handy way of disposing of all those pod people from *Body Snatchers*.)

Although every moment in the film has the gleam of calculation to it, under the circumstances it's all been surpassingly well executed. As opposed to, say, *The Wiz*, *Superman*'s art direction is not only opulent but witty; a particular highlight is Hackman's iniquitous lair, a subterranean Grand Central Station, with a murky swimming pool where the information booth ought to be. The airborne special ef-

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

fects are awesome, for the most part, and Williams's music adroitly mines and recycles those strains from Erich Korngold's *King's Row* theme that he hadn't already purloined for *Star Wars*. It was a stroke of inspiration on someone's part to hire the Benton-Newman team to toil on the screenplay, since Benton and David Newman's witty Broadway musical version of the comic strip was the first attempt ever to make this legend palatable for adults—even if the camp sensibility hadn't yet penetrated the theater-party crowd sufficiently in the mid-sixties to make it a real hit.

Times have changed, of course, and the movie gracefully walks the tightrope between childlike ingenuousness and good-natured lampoon; the audience can root for Superman in his battle for "truth, justice and the American way" and still chuckle at the inanity of it all. The chaste romance between Superman and Lois is really engaging, thanks to some sly writing and the clever notion of using our hero's powers as a kind of tongue-in-cheek sexual Freudianism. When Superman takes his heartthrob on a tour of the heavens, their flight turns into a dreamy substitute for orgasm, titillating the grown-ups in the crowd while innocently captivating the kiddies.

But the wisest choice of all was the decision to create a superstar for the title role rather than hiring one. The minute he puts on that silly get-up, Christopher Reeve faces hurdles far more daunting than the skyscrapers of Metropolis, but he never makes a wrong move, in the stratosphere or on terra firma. As Clark Kent, he even creates a face that looks woven out of charcoal grey worsted, while as the Man of Steel his sweet, bashful rectitude makes it abundantly clear what Lois Lane really sees in him. Against my better judgment, *Superman* finally won me over too, though I felt vaguely guilty about it for hours afterward. Like *Star Wars*, *Superman* tries to turn you back into a credulous eight year old, but after the final fade-out, what you really feel like is Pavlov's dog. ❑

OUT AND AROUND

Every Which Way But Loose—The annual Christmas goodie from Clint Eastwood is without a doubt the year's most aggressively yahoo movie. An alleged comedy whose plot is interrupted every five minutes so that Eastwood can show off his pecs and punch people out (principally a group of Hell's Angels baddies, who make their forebears from the *Beach Party* series seem like figures out of *cinéma vérité*), it should have been titled *All About Ego*. Eastwood is supported by a cast including Ruth Gordon, the inevitable Sondra Locke, and an orangutan (a real one) named Clyde, who must have had a hand in the script.

Same Time Next Year—An extremely literal transcription of the long-running stage play that only serves to underscore the material's cutesy contrivances. For all his facility, Alan Alda can't quite compensate for the fact that his ferretlike features don't translate well to the big screen, but Ellen Burstyn manages to wring some poignance and charm from a role that takes advantage of her ingratiating if limited talents. If only you could *see* her—this movie has been photographed through so much gauze that your eyes start watering halfway into the first reel. ❑

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

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